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LEAVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY
JOSEPH LAvIrrt
ABSTRACT

In twenty-first century American courts, dysfunctional outcomes
invariably follow the formalistic application of the most salient doctrinal
distinctions. Attempts by legal taxonomists to delineate the boundaries
between contract and tort law are especially ineffectual. Still, courts irregularly determine the obtainable remedies for legally cognizable injuries based on the way these capricious taxonomic boundaries are drawn.
Doctrinal distinctions that demonstrably operate poorly unfairly persist.
Tellingly, contemporary challenges arising out of a flawed system
of classification typified by the tort and contract taxa are not the result of
ineluctable progress in the legal system of the United States. To the contrary, these classifications are rooted in competing crosscurrents of legal
theory debated both in the United States and England during a period
roughly measured from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth century (generally, thefin de sicle).
Owing to a burst of intellectual vigor and systemic reform during
the fin de si~cle, an end might have been achieved to the then-nascent but
now familiar taxonomy of legal claims. Instead, since this period, purported doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract theory have become ever more firmly embedded in the American judicial psyche and
legal practice.
This Article exposes the role that legal taxonomy plays in contemporary legal scholarship and practice, and then accounts for and laments
the product of fateful choices during the fin de si6cle-a period of both
great progress and regression in the development of the legal system in
the United States. A neoteric, rights-based juridical model is then presented as a better alternative to parsing claims and restricting relief based
on the fuzzy legal taxa that are prevalent today.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In twenty-first century American courts, dysfunctional outcomes
invariably follow the formalistic application of the most salient doctrinal
distinctions. Attempts by legal taxonomists to delineate the boundaries
between contract and tort law are especially ineffectual. Deciding whether a claim "sounds" in contract or tort would be farcical if not for the
injustice thereby wrought. Courts irregularly determine the obtainable
remedies for legally cognizable injuries based on the way these capricious taxonomic boundaries are drawn. Doctrinal distinctions that demonstrably operate poorly unfairly persist.
Tellingly, contemporary challenges arising out of the flawed system
of classification typified by the tort and contract taxa are not the result of
ineluctable progress in the legal system of the United States. To the contrary, these classifications are rooted in competing crosscurrents of legal
theory debated both in the United States and England during a period
roughly measured from the mid-nineteenth until the early twentieth century (generally, thefin de sijcle).
A burst of intellectual vigor and systemic reform during the fin de
sidcle put at risk and nearly stifled the then-nascent but now familiar
taxonomy of legal claims. Instead, since this period, purported doctrinal
distinctions typified by the tort and contract taxa have become ever more
firmly embedded in the American judicial psyche and legal practice.
Contemporary legal taxonomists uncannily devote considerable energy to the classification of claims according to fuzzy doctrinal lines that
are often illogical. Their ongoing efforts to fine-tune and thereby ration-
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alize inherently unreliable taxa are rewarded only when an injured party
is denied relief based on invented and often arbitrary taxonomic distinctions. The pursuit of legal taxonomy, as it is presently conceived, is thus
revealed as an inherently insufferable enterprise.
Legal taxonomists cannot justify the imprecise classification of legal claims by claiming that precise classification of legal claims is impossible. The fault lies not in the stars. Worse still, contemporary legal
taxonomists tend also to blame jurists and attorneys for misapplying or
failing to understand the incongruous and indefensible classifications
they have devised. Responsibility for the inconsistent classification of
like claims instead falls squarely on the proponents of legal taxa that
cannot be consistently applied by highly trained professionals. If equal
treatment under the law is the essence of what is just, then for the contemporary legal taxonomist apparently there must be injustice everywhere to preserve an existing but defective classification of legal claims.
No system based on this unbefitting premise can (or will) long endure.
This Article exposes the dysfunctional role that contemporary legal
taxonomy plays in legal scholarship and practice today, and then accounts for and laments this product of fateful choices during the fin de
sidcle-a period of both great progress and regression in the development of the legal system in the United States. This account delivers a
fresh perspective on current legal taxonomy and uncovers an understanding of primary rights and plenary forms of relief proposed during the fin
de sidcle as an alternative to abjure it. The neoteric, rights-based juridical
model presented herein is a better alternative to parsing claims and restricting relief based on the fuzzy contemporary legal taxa and a viable
means to relegate contemporary legal taxonomy to the dustbin of legal
history in which it belongs.
II. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY FAILS TO RELIABLY CLASSIFY
TORT AND CONTRACT CLAMS

As Dean William Prosser noted in 1953, the now-venerated foci of
the civil law canon known as tort and contract were derived from precisely the same medieval English writs.' Indeed, the contemporary doctrinal categories of contract and tort are the product of a relatively recent
advent and did not take root in American courts until the latter half of the
nineteenth century.2 Encrusted now like barnacles, supposed distinctions
1. See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Torts and Contract, in SELECTED
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380, 381 (1953); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the
Boundary Between Contracts and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 461 (1994) ("Although opposing
philosophies underlie torts and contracts, the two bodies of law exist side-by-side the world over
.... Dean Prosser pointed out in 1954 that the historical relations between common law contract and
tort were not antagonistic and that contract law actually grew from the same writs that lawyers used
for what we now think of as tort claims.").
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 161 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995)
2.
("Until the late nineteenth century, the dividing line between 'contract' and 'tort' had never been
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between tort and contract law render almost entirely unrecognizable the
structure of a system better suited to vindicate the violation of primary
rights (a topic to which this Article will turn in Part III). Scraping these
barnacles away reveals a theory of rights and remedies far superior to the
contemporary miasma of indistinct and ambiguous limitations on remedies based on hide-bound doctrinal classifications.
Before turning to a rights-based alternative to contemporary legal
taxonomy, whimsical and wishful thinking on the part of some that all is
well on the border between the law of torts and contracts first must be
dispelled. Some courts and scholars are in denial about the erosion of this
boundary and will hold fast to the fiction that contract law governs exclusively, or at least should govern exclusively, the range of available
remedies arising out of breach of purely consensual obligations. Below,
several examples demonstrate contrariwise that unalloyed doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract theory are a chimera.
A. A CategoricalMuddle: The Failureto Reliably Classify Claims Arisingfrom the Negligent Performanceof ContractualDuties
The negligent performance of a contractual duty presents a particularly thorny problem of doctrinal classification. A perceived need for
such classification arises more often than not when remedies or defenses
sharply drawn .... ); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1246 (2001)
("[T]he recognition of contract as a fundamental department of substantive law by 1870 did not
entail the acceptance of tort as well."); David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedureand
Legal Realism as a Jurisprudenceof Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 475 (2010) ("The familiar
doctrinal categories of contract and tort did not exist before the latter half of the nineteenth century."); Mark P. Gergen, Negligent Misrepresentationas Contract 16 (Berkeley Program in Law and
Economics, Working Paper Series, 2011), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/lvcoj5x5
("Contract is not written about as a generic category of obligation by common lawyers until the late
18th and early 19th century. As late as 1800, if a lawyer bungled your case, a carrier damaged your
goods, or a farrier bungled in shoeing your horse, and you sought legal redress in an English or
American court, you would not bring an action for negligence, professional malpractice, or breach of
contract. Instead you would bring an action either for assumpsit or for trespass on the case.").
3. Some scholars believe that contmct law reigns supreme within clearly defined boundaries.
See, e.g., William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1224-26 (1994) ("In fact, [the]
Balkanized structure [of tort, property and contract law] reveals that the paradigms of the different
bodies of law are not really coequal. The negligence paradigm takes a back seat. . .. [C]ontract law
embodies the ideology of autonomy and consent and assigns decision-making power to markets.
Sometimes, however, the predicates for the application of contract law are not present, for example,
when disputes arise between noncontracting strangers or when a party to a contract is mentally
incompetent. Thus, we do not need to refer either to another body of law-such as tort law-or to
some extradoctrinal normative system in order to keep contract law from devouring the entire legal
world. Contract law, along with its accompanying prime directive of agreement and consent, sets its
own limits. Tort law waits in the background to step in and resolve the disputes that occur when no
contractual relationship is present. In other words, tort law fills in when, due to contract law's own
rules about its applicability, we do not have the option of using contract law."); Dennis Patterson,
Good Faith in Tort and ContractLaw: A Comment, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1994) ("Ever since
it emerged as a distinct body of law, contract law has consistently been under the threat of reabsorption into tort law. However, despite the persistence of this theme in academic literature, one sees in
the actual work of courts little serious threat to the autonomy of contract. In short, even given the
distinct overlap and occasional congruence, a merger of tort law and contract law appears most
unlikely.").
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that are typically allowed only in an action by one who has been
"wronged" are sought in an action for breach of contract.
A breach of contract, it is oft said, constitutes no legal wrong.4 Rather, a contract adjusts the volitional relation of autonomous parties, requiring them to "consider" one another only insofar as they have agreed.
As thus conceived, scholars and courts that adhere to rigid doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract agree that breach of a contractual
obligation gives rise to a claim only by a party to the contract that created
it, and only for those consequential losses that were contemplated by the
parties to the agreement at the time of its formation.5 Thus, a promisor
may breach a contract "efficiently" and without moral opprobrium or
legal penalty.6
Are these legal aphorisms even putatively sound? If a doctor botches a surgery without justification, should it matter whether a contract
with the patient required the doctor to exercise ordinary care? Should the
nature and scope of the liability of a painter contracted to paint a home
turn on whether the painter drips paint on a surface not within an agreed
scope of work? Answering these questions sheds light on two principal
approaches taken by courts struggling to stay within the strictures that
contemporary doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract law impose.
Courts have understood a case involving a doctor's botched surgery
to afford an opportunity to distinguish tort from contract theory based on
the nature of the conduct at issue. The location of the painter's drip has
been understood to afford the opportunity to distinguish tort from contract theory based on the consequence of the conduct at issue. Each of
these approaches is considered below in turn. Each approach is unmanageable and thus leads inexorably to a dilution of sought-after, clear doctrinal divisions between tort and contract law.

4. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLuM. L.
REv. 1145, 1147 (1970) ("Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach.... [This] adds to the celebrated
freedom to make contracts, a considerable freedom to break them as well.").
5.
See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004) ("A
breach of contract remedy assumes that the parties to a contract can negotiate the risk of loss occasioned by a breach. '[W]hen two parties make a contract, they agree upon the rules and regulations
which will govern their relationship; the risks inherent in the agreement and the likelihood of its
breach. The parties to the contract in essence create a mini-universe for themselves, in which each
voluntarily chooses his contracting partner, each trusts the other's willingness to keep his word and
honor his commitments, and in which they define their respective obligations, rewards and risks.
Under such a scenario, it is appropriate to enforce only such obligations as each party voluntarily
assumed, and to give him only such benefits as he expected to receive; this is the function of contract
law."' (alteration in original) (quoting Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d
454, 461 (Cal. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. See id.; Farnsworth, supranote 4, at 1147.
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1. Distinguishing a Tort from a Pure Breach of Contract Based on
the Nature of the Actor's Conduct
Attempts since the fin de si~cle to classify claims against a physician for avoidable injury to a patient demonstrate an impressive shift in
significant doctrinal distinctions. During the nineteenth century, American courts usually found that a duty to perform with ordinary professional skill and care arose out of a contract to provide medical services. An
"implied in fact" promise to perform medical services competently was
understood not only as an implied in fact term of a physician's contract
with a patient but also as an independently enforceable obligation without regard to a general common law duty of care independent of the contract.
The nascent tort of "medical malpractice" was analytically keyed to
this implied promise by a physician to act competently and skillfully. By
the outset of the twentieth century, courts nearly uniformly recognized
the implied promise by a physician to perform with "reasonable care" to
be indistinguishable from the duty to act with care imposed by operation
of law in negligence actions. 9 Pure contract theory could then be understood in these cases as too incompatible with the nature or gravamen of
an action for medical malpractice to allow the hallmarks of contract law
to prevail. Thus, as time passed and experience with this category of cases grew, courts became increasingly reluctant to permit in an action
against a careless physician any resort to the statute of limitations on
contract claims'o and progressively more precautious about attempts to
assert the contractual right to disclaim tort liability in such cases."

7. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Collins, 25 N.W. 632, 633 (Minn. 1885) ("[l1t seems to us clear
that this is an action on the contract. The gist and gravamen is the breach of its terms, which, whether express or implied, were that these physicians and surgeons would treat the plaintiff with ordinary
professional skill and care. It would have been impossible for plaintiff to state his cause of action
without alleging the contract, for the liability of the defendant arose solely out of it, and not out of
some general common-law duty independent of contract.").
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Toles, 150 N.W. 118, 120 (Mich. 1914) ("[T]he implied contract
between the surgeon and patient is ... to use that degree of diligence and skill which is ordinarily
possessed by the average of the members of the profession in similar localities, giving due consideration to the state of the art at the time.... [On] testimony of an expert character tending to show
malpractice, [the jury] should be permitted to draw inferences of negligent conduct on the part of
defendant.").
10. See, e.g., Frankel v. Wolper, 169 N.Y.S. 15, 16-17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918) ("The question
is whether this action against a physician is for breach of contract or malpractice. If for the latter, it
is barred by a statute of limitations, whether it arose from lack of requisite skill or negligent exercise
of it. The question is not whether the plaintiff could declare on a contract to cure her, and for the
breach of it recover damages for failure to make the cure. . . .[H]ere the damages alleged are unsuited to an action on contract, and help to characterize the complaint as one for malpractice and negligence. It is useless to discuss the authorities, as the decision [that the tort statute of limitations applies] is placed upon the ground that the complaint does not declare on contract.").
11.
See, e.g., Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that an exculpatory contract executed between the patient and health care providers was no
defense because it was contrary to public policy).
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By the mid-twentieth century, courts forthrightly declared tort theory de rigueur in cases of medical malpractice. As definitively stated by
the once oft-cited opinion in Kozan v. Comstockl2: "On principle ... we
consider a [medical] malpractice action as tortious in nature whether the
duty grows out of a contractual relation or has no origin in contract."' 3
At present, a cause of action against a physician for careless performance typically sounds solely in tort, and any implied promise to act
with care is considered to be mainly immaterial. 14 Although the physician-patient relationship is nearly invariably consensual (and accompanied by a myriad of adhesive contractual terms),' 5 most contemporary
American courts will hold a physician to a duty and standard of care that
arises by operation of law (rather than by reason of express or implied
contractual assent). 16
Because a duty of due care imposed by operation of law is considered to supplant any similar contractual duty, a physician generally may
not avoid liability to a patient in tort for careless performance.' 7 Thus,
with respect to consensual relations between a physician and patient,
contemporary legal taxonomy fails to recognize the principal signet impressed on the contract taxa: judicial deference to the private ordering of
obligations that are voluntarily assumed."
The doctrinal distinctions applicable to breach of a physician's contract have not been universally applied to service contracts generally,
however. The nature of the contracted services is sometimes claimed to
12.
270 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1959).
Id. at 845.
13.
14.
Contemporary American courts often reject outright the theory that breach of an implied
promise to act with care undergirds the liability of a physician for malpractice. See, e.g., Woolley v.
Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1135 (Me. 1980) ("In addition to the inadequacy of implied contract as a
comprehensive liability base in malpractice actions, we discern additional reasons for eschewing any
reliance upon a theory that a physician has breached an implied contractual duty of due care. First,
the reasonableness of a physician's conduct can be adequately determined under familiar tort principles without the necessity of importing into malpractice actions commercial concepts with traditionally distinct rules as to theory, proof, damages, limitation periods and venue. Second, and related to
the foregoing, recognizing the continued vitality of implied contract as an independent cause of
action would be fundamentally inconsistent with the modern view that malpractice actions should be
predicated on a single basis of liability-deviation from the professional standard of care-with the
application of common evidentiary and procedural rules." (citations omitted)).
15.
Some scholars still believe the patient-physician relationship to be principally contractual
and eerily suggest that a physician should gain therefrom even more than mere monetary remuneration. See, e.g., John Portmann, Physician-PatientRelationship: Like Marriage, Without the Romance, 173 W.J. MED. 279, 280 (2000) ("No matter what else it aims to be, the patient-physician
relationship is a contract involving the exchange of money and services. . .. [Four] assumptions
underlie the physician-patient contract: both the physician and the patient have unique responsibilities; the physician-patient relationship is consensual, not obligatory; both the physician and the
patient must be willing to negotiate; and physician and patient each must gain something in their
encounters. Nothing in this list contradicts a contractual description of marriage, which similarly
stands on an exchange of money and services.").
16.
See, e.g., Woolley, 418 A.2d at 1134; Kozan, 270 F.2d at 845.
See, e.g., Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
17.
See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 275 (Cal. 2004).
18.
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be a reference point by which courts can ascertain whether an action arising out of careless performance of a contract sounds in tort, contract, or
both. A common statement on this point is as follows:
There is in truth sometimes a thin distinction drawn between
whether an action is grounded in tort or a contract. Generally, the test
of distinction seems to be that if the claim is based on a breach of
specific terms of the contract without any reference to the legal duties
implied by law upon the relationship created thereby, the action is in
contract; whereas, if there is a contract for services which places the
parties in such relation to each other that in an attempt to perform the
promised service, a duty imposed by law as a result of the contractual
relationship is breached, then the gravamen of the action is the breach
of the legal duty rather than a breach of the contract, and so is a
tort. 19
This widely accepted formulation is the juridical equivalent of answering the question "under what circumstances does a careless breach
of a service contract sound in tort?" with the answer "when a court states
that the services entail a duty enforceable in tort." The rule stated above
is pure tautology. It fails as a reliable basis to distinguish negligent
breaches of contract that give rise to a cause of action in tort from those
that do not because courts do not discover duties imposed by law in contractual relations but rather declare them. 20
By claiming that a tort action arises out of the misperformance of
duties "imposed by law," a court presupposes discretion (within the
bounds of precedent) to pick and choose those relations that qualify for
the imposition of a legal duty to perform carefully enforceable in tort.2 1
By implicitly stating that a court decides whether certain consensual relationships implicate duties that are "imposed by law," a court presupposes
the power to transform any breach of contract that gives rise to a cause of
action that sounds exclusively in contract into a breach that gives rise to
a cause of action that sounds exclusively or concurrently in tort.22
There is no principled basis to distinguish contractual relationships
that entail a duty to perform with care and skill enforceable in tort from
19. Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 908 (Mont. 1990).
20. This point was generally conceded by the court in Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go,
L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 506 n.3 (Iowa 2011) ("In our view, it does not advance the analysis to assert
that [the defendant] owed an 'independent duty' . . . to use ordinary care. This rephrases the question, but does not answer it. We have said 'the existence of a duty is a policy decision, based on the
relevant circumstances, that the law should protect a particular person from a particular type of
harm.' . . . Whether [or not] the issue is framed in terms of... the scope of an actor's duty, we still
need to make the underlying determination whether tort law affords a potential remedy." (quoting
Van Essen v. McCormick Enters. Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 719 (lowa 1999))).
21.
Id.
22. Billings Clinic, 797 P.2d at 909 ("A scissors more sharp than we command is required to
pare away the contract implications from the tort claim here. The claims exist mutually in contract
and in tort.").
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those that do not. Courts often concede this point by stating categorically
that accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with
care and skill, and that a failure to do so is a tort as well as a breach of
contract. 23 Despite this axiom, however, even with respect to contracts
that call for specialized or so-called professional services, not all courts
and scholars can agree that breach of a common law duty to perform
with care and skill is always a tort. The axiom is disregarded with regularity in practice, giving lie to the law and further undermining the taxo. .
.
.
24
nomic classification of essentially similar
claims.
Thus, when it comes to the liability of accountants for avoidable errors in the course and scope of contractually undertaken services, varying
results in the Unites States are, as the expression goes, all over the map. 25
Many, perhaps most, states presently adhere to the view that tort is the
exclusive theory of recovery against an accountant for misfeasance. 26
Yet, some jurisdictions suggest that a contract theory might still be
viable in such cases, even in the absence of a promise to obtain a specific
23.
E.g., N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 466, 470-71 (Ct. App. 1997)
("[F]or over fifty years California has ... recognized the fundamental principle that
'[a]ccompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of these
conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract.' The rule which imposes this duty is of universal application as to all persons who by contract undertake professional or other business engagements requiring the exercise of care, skill and knowledge; the obligation is implied by law and
need not be stated in the agreement.' . . . A contract to perform services gives rise to a duty of care
which requires that such services be performed in a competent and reasonable manner. A negligent
failure to do so may be both a breach of contract and a tort. In such a hybrid circumstance, the plaintiff is entitled to pursue both legal theories until an occasion for an election of remedies arises."
(citations omitted) (quoting Roscoe Moss Co. v. Jenkins, 130 P.2d 477, 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1942))); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 470 (Wis. 2004)
("[C]ontract law is not better suited than tort law for dealing with negligently provided services. Tort
law provides an incentive generally to guard against negligent conduct in the provision of services. If
tort law is avoided, the ability to deter certain activity is impaired because contract remedies and
warranties may be easily disclaimed. Tort principles address more than merely a private interest
between two commercial companies; they also address society's interest in minimizing harm by
deterring negligent conduct.").
24. See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 280 (Cal. 2004) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) ("[The] taxonomy of contract cases where tort liability may be found is descriptive, not prescriptive. It offers no specific rationale for the characteristics shared by past cases allowing tort recovery, nor does it purport to say that all cases that fall within one or another category will
necessarily give rise to tort liability. It thus does not advance the analysis.").
25.
See, e.g., Howard M. Garfield & Thomas Weathers, A Survey ofAccountant Malpractice:
Breach of Contract or Tort?, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 1995, at 275 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-526, 1995) ("States divide on whether a claim by a client
against its auditor for malpractice sounds in contract as well as in tort.").
26.
See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2004) ("[T]he
breach of contract allegations amount to nothing more than the re-framing of a negligence or malpractice claim against the accounting firm."). But see Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 275-76
("According to one commentator, '[t]he rule in a majority of states is that a plaintiff cannot sue a
professional for breach of contract on the professional's failure to render services with due professional care.' This may or may not be an accurate statement. Apparently, an almost equal number of
states divide on whether a plaintiff can or cannot base a malpractice cause of action against an accountant on breach of contract." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Samuel J. Winer
et al., Accountant's Liabilityfor Audits of Savings & Loan Associations, C646 ALl-ABA 157, 167
(1991))).
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result.2 7 In these jurisdictions, courts may find that a claim against an
accountant for careless performance sounds concurrently in tort and contract.28 Other jurisdictions might still cling to the old implied in fact
promise to exercise care to justify finding that an action against an accountant for malpractice sounds in contract. 29 Regrettably, under the present system, the wrong choice of legal theory may result in dire conse30
quences.
Paradoxical examples of courts attempting to distinguish tort from
contract claims arising out of the careless performance of contractually
undertaken obligations abound. Examining these attempts with respect to
claims against doctors and accountants only begins to survey the field.
For example, cases deciding whether attorney malpractice sounds in tort
or contract are often equally incoherent.
A case in point is Jackson State Bank v. King.32 In 1993, the Wyoming Supreme Court held:
Even though legal malpractice may be attributable to negligence on
the part of the attorney, still the right to recompense is based upon the
breach of the contract with the client. It follows that, because this re27. See, e.g., Blumberg v. Touche Ross & Co., 514 So. 2d 922, 927 (Ala. 1987) ("[W]e are
certain that New York would allow a contract action against an accountant for the accountant's
failure to exercise due care."); Allied Int'l Bancorp, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 530
N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (finding contract action against accountant for failure to exercise
due care in performance of contract permissible so long as client seeks recovery for pecuniary harm).
Some commentators believe that the trend in the United States is to recognize both tort and contract
liability arising out of accountant malpractice. See Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 289 ("[As
certain] cases illustrate, disparity exists between the states as to whether a plaintiff can bring an
accountant malpractice action in contract as well as tort. Several jurisdictions hold that a plaintiff can
state a claim under either or both theories, but offer little reasoning supporting such a rule. Nonetheless, the trend, as evidenced by New York, may be toward permitting claims for both negligence
and/or breach of contract against an accountant who fails to adhere to the standard of professional
care. ... [l]f the trend is true and a plaintiff can sue under one or both theories, a plaintiff should
take care to appreciate the differences between the theories, particularly any applicable statute of
limitations.").
28. See, e.g., Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 909 (Mont. 1990)
("We cannot therefore agree with Peat Marwick that the Clinic had only a single form of claim
against the Peat Marwick defendants.... The claims exist mutually in contract and in tort.").
29. See, e.g., In re Am. Reserve Corp., 70 B.R. 729, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) ("Under
Illinois law . . . a professional may impliedly contract to render services in a manner consistent with
the skill and care of those in the profession. Actions in contract may be based on this implied obligation; in such actions, liability is predicated on the failure to perform an agreed undertaking rather
than upon negligence." (citations omitted)).
30. See, e.g., Garfield & Weathers, supra note 25, at 274 (describing several distinctions
between "an action ... based in contract and an action based in tort law" including "(1) a longer
statute of limitations may apply to contract actions; (2) the defense of contributory or comparative
negligence may be unavailable in a contract action; (3) a nonclient plaintiff may claim that it was an
intended third-party beneficiary of a contract . . ; (4) expert witness testimony may be unnecessary
to prove a breach of contract; (5) different jury instructions might apply; (6) in a contract action the
plaintiff may have to be the party with whom the [defendant] had the contract; and (7) the contract
measure of damages might differ from the tort measure of damages").
31.
See Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1292 (1963) ("American
courts have exhibited disagreement and inconsistency regarding the theory underlying actions for
[legal] malpractice."); id. at 1292 n.4 (listing cases exhibiting such inconsistencies).
32.
844 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1993).
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lationship is contractual in nature[, it] is to be treated according to the
law of contracts .... .3
Then, nine years later in Long-Russell v. Hampe,34 the same court
found that a legal malpractice action sounded in negligence (but refused
to affirm an award of damages for emotional distress because such recovery is ambiguously reserved for other subcategories of tort claims).35
Summarily stated, results in this area of the law remain intolerably
inconsistent despite decades of judicial tinkering. The law imposes a
duty to perform all contractual duties with care, but not all negligently
performed contractual duties give rise to an action in tort. Even those that
do don't necessarily give rise to every otherwise available tort remedy. In
addition, as demonstrated immediately below, there is yet another criterion that often plays a determinative role in the attempt to distinguish tort
from contract theory in cases arising out of the misperformance of agreed
services.
2. Distinguishing a Tort from a Breach of Contract Based on the
Consequence of an Actor's Conduct
May a homebuyer recover in tort from a contractor who built her
home a money judgment representing the cost to repair construction defects attributable to the builder's negligent deviations from the applicable
building codes or industry standards? In a case that highlights perfectly
the incongruous state of American law on this subject at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, the California Supreme Court answered, "No." 36
In Aas v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court surveyed
the prevailing law in other jurisdictions and forthrightly acknowledged
that many of those jurisdictions had answered the question differently,
though any hope for uniformity would have been misplaced.37 In South
Carolina, a builder stood liable in tort for the diminished value of a house
caused by negligent deviations from applicable building codes or indus-

33.
Id. at 1096; see also id at 1094-95 (noting that Wyoming's comparative negligence
statute did not bar plaintiffs recovery in a legal malpractice action based on claims for breach of
contract, even though the jury apportioned fault to plaintiff, because a legal malpractice action is
based on an implied warranty that the work performed by an attorney for his client will be performed
in a skillful and professional manner).
34.
39 P.3d 1015 (Wyo. 2002).
35.
See id. at 1019-20 ("Our analysis is complicated by the hybrid nature of claims for legal
malpractice. To state a claim for legal malpractice, one must show that the 'defendant acted negligently or in breach of contract.' We have recognized that the two theories will frequently be interchangeable in legal malpractice cases. However, . . . [i]f we were to affirm the award of damages for
emotional distress in this case, we would be sanctioning a similar award whenever a lawyer breached
his or her contract with a client by negligently performing the promised legal services. This we are
not willing to do." (citations omitted)).
36.
Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1130-33 (Cal. 2000), superseded by statute, 2003
Cal. Stat. 722, as recognized in Rosen v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 70 P.3d 351, 356-57 (Cal. 2003).
37. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130-33, 1131 n.7.
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try standards.38 In Maryland, a homeowner could recover in a negligence
action the reasonable cost of correcting only construction defects that
presented "a clear danger of death or personal injury." 39 The Supreme
Court of Indiana permitted a tort action arising out of negligent construction to avoid a risk of physical harm.40 In North Carolina, a homeowner
could state a cause of action for negligence against the builder of her
home by alleging that she was "forced to undergo extensive demolition
and repair work to correct . . . defective, dangerous and unsafe conditions
caused by the defendant's negligence." 4 1 The Nevada Supreme Court,
after first indicating that a homeowner could recover in tort for the negligent framing of her home,4 2 then held on appeal after remand in the same
case that no tort liability arose from negligent construction that resulted
in damage to only the home and its components.4 3
In light of these irregular decisions and those from other jurisdictions, the California Supreme Court in Aas rightly noted that whether a
cause of action arising out of a contractor's negligence sounds in tort,
contract, or both is "not [a] simple [question], because it arises from the
nebulous and troublesome margin between tort and contract law."" That
was, to say the least, an understatement.
The court in Aas chose a familiar criterion to determine whether the
contractor's negligence gave rise to a cause of action in tort. The Aas

38. See Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 384 S.E.2d 730, 738 (S.C. 1989).
39. See Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 517
A.2d 336, 345 n.5 (Md. 1986); see also id. at 345 ("We conclude that the determination of whether a
duty will be imposed in this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent
conduct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant damage. Where
the risk is of death or personal injury the action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of correcting the dangerous condition.").
40. See Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (Ind. 1976). But see Fisher v.
Simon, 112 N.W.2d 705, 708-10 (Wis. 1961) ("[A]ccompanying every contract is a common law
duty to perform it with care and skill, and a failure to do so is a tort as well as a breach of contract.... [W]e can perceive of no public policy which would be promoted by relieving a buildervendor from liability for damages caused by defective construction due to his failure to exercise
ordinary care. As between the vendee and the builder-vendor, we deem it more equitable that the
loss resulting from negligent construction, in a case of a latent defect, should be borne by the latter
rather than the former.").
41.
Oates v. Jag, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (N.C. 1985).
42. Calloway v. City of Reno, 939 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Nev. 1997), superseded by statute, 2003
Nev. Stat. 362, as recognized in Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31, 33 (Nev. 2004) ("Subcontractors
could clearly foresee that homeowners would live in the homes they framed. The Subcontractors
could also foresee that if they negligently performed their framing work, structural damage and
water intrusion could develop and force each homeowner to pay repair costs. Further, the costs of
repairing the framing defects and water damage are reasonably calculable by a person in the trade.
Therefore, we conclude that the Subcontractors need not be protected by the shield of the economic
loss rule."). The court in Olson v. Richard, recognized that Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.600-40.770 supersedes Calloway. Olson, 89 P.3d 31, 33 (Nev. 2004).
43. See Calloway, 993 P.2d 1259, 1269-70 (Nev. 2000) (holding negligence claims against
subcontractors alleging that defective framing caused water intrusion and structural decay without
merit because the allegations involved pure economic loss).
44. See Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1130 (Cal. 2000).
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majority essentially asked: "What harm has the negligence caused?" 45
Though the contractor may have had a common law duty to perform the
contract to build the home with care and skill, the negligent failure to do
so, according to a majority of the California Supreme Court, was not
actionable in tort until and unless a particular type of harm resulted from
the breach.46
The Aas court carefully traced the history of recovery in tort for
negligently performed services to reach this conclusion. 4 7 After observing that "this [question of taxonomy] implicates [many considerations of
social policy]," the court denied recovery in tort because it could not
"justify[] ... the imposition of liability for construction defects that have
not caused harm of the sort traditionally compensable in tort . . . ."" The

"sort" of harm to which the court referred was "physical harm." 4 9
To be sure, reasoning backward from the "sort" of harm claimed
has often been used as a proxy for a better means to distinguish tort from
contract claims. Some courts sometimes have required a showing of
some modicum of some kind of physical harm to maintain a cause of
action in tort. For example, early in the twentieth century, the illustrious
jurist Benjamin Cardozo disavowed the doctrine of contractual privity
and found tort liability to the ultimate user of a negligently manufactured
chattel that caused bodily injury.o Judge Cardozo made clear that a duty

45.
Dissenting in Aas, Justice Mosk refrained the majority's question and then answered it
himself as follows: "[T]he majority's rhetorical question [is] 'What harm?' I would say, the harm
that will arise when homeowners, believing, as humans are wont to do, that injury only befalls others, fail to repair hazardous conditions." Id at 1156 (Mosk, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
46.
Id. at 1135 (majority opinion).
47.
Id.atll31-34.
48.
Id. at 1142.
49.
Use of the term of art "physical harm" can be ambiguous. For example, the authors of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability refer to "harm to persons or property, commonly
referred to as personal injury and property damage." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § I cmt. d (1998). Ambiguity in use of these terms arises, inter alia,because "personal

injury" can be physical, emotional, or some other sort of harm. For ease of reference, the term
"physical harm" will be used herein to connote a measurable physical change in the condition of a
human being or property, recognizing that physiological changes can be manifested by psychological conditions and vice versa.
50.
Compare MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916) (holding
that a manufacturer is subject to tort liability without regard to privity whenever "the nature of a
[manufactured] thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made"), with Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.) (holding that a postman seriously injured when a mail coach collapsed was unable to state a claim against the mail
coach repairer in tort, because the repairer's contract was with the postman's employer). Courts and
scholars often appear at the ready to spin Winterboltom to point to some idiosyncratic contention
about the holding in the case. Two aspects of contract law compelled the result: first, the postman
was not a party to the contract with the repairer (i.e., not in privity); and second, the court did not
find that the contractual relationship between the repairer and the postman's employer implicated a
duty to the postman that would be "imposed by law" (i.e., a tort duty). The court in Winterbottom
stated: "There is also a class of cases in which the law permits a contract to be turned into a tort; but
[only if| there has been some public duty undertaken, or public nuisance committed." Id. Rather than
solely an "assault upon the citadel of privity" (to which then-New York Court of Appeals Judge
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arose by operation of law to avoid negligently created risks of bodily
injury.5 1 His path-breaking decision was a major step along the way to
unifying the tort and contract law canon; liability did not depend on contractual niceties. However, by focusing (at times inferentially) on the
manifested result that the risk of bodily injury produced as the pronounced rationale to avoid the privity rules in contract, the great Cardozo
perhaps inadvertently helped to nurture the seeds of an artificial distinction upon which the Aas court seized nearly a century later.
The Aas court found that the mere presence of defects in a home as
a result of negligent construction would not qualify as the type of physical harm "traditionally" required to support a cause of action in tort.52 in
a very Cardozian vein, the Aas court speculated that the conduct of the
builder might give rise to tort liability because someone might scratch a
finger or bruise a toe owing to the negligent construction. But, according
to the court in Aas, no tort liability would lie to compensate for the costs
to ameliorate a negligently created risk of not yet realized bodily injury
or property damage:
For .. . negligent services that have caused neither property damage
nor personal injury, . . . tort remedies have been uncertain....

[D]eviations from standards of quality that have not resulted in property damage or personal injury. . . are primarily the domain of contract and warranty law ... rather than of negligence. In actions for

negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries; no recovery is allowed for economic loss alone.

..

. This

general principle, the so-called economic loss rule, is the primary obstacle to plaintiffs' claim.53

Cardozo referred in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)), the second aspect
of the Winterbottom rationale correspondingly was assaulted by Judge Cardozo in MacPherson.
51.
See MacPherson, Ill N.E. at 1051 ("We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation where it ought not be. We have put its
source in the law.").
52. The terribly convoluted and illogical analysis that is required to determine whether negligent construction has caused "property damage" is exemplified by this passage:
In a single paragraph and without significant analysis, the majority . .. substantially
erodes the demarcation between contract and tort'law in California. Plaintiffs allege they
bought a product (a mass-produced home) that included defective components (the windows), which malfunctioned, damaging the product [the home] as a whole but otherwise
causing no personal injury or property damage.. . . As such, [this] is a purely commercial
dispute involving failure to deliver bargained-for value (monetary harm) and dependent
for its resolution on the terms of the parties' agreement.
Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 459-60 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Calloway v. City of Reno, 999 P.2d
1259, 1273, 1275 (Nev. 2000) (Maupin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting, in
dictum, that a tort claim could have been maintained against negligent framing subcontractors had
the water intrusion caused by their negligence ruined, instead of the structure, a non-fixed carpet
within it, i.e., personal property not part of the "single integrated entity" at issue (the home) that the
subcontractor framed).
53. Aas, 12 P.3d at 1130-31 (citations omitted); see also infra note 104.
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The "economic loss rule" to which the court referred is a product of
the struggle to distinguish tort from contract law. By focusing on the
consequence of carelessly performed services, the economic loss rule
purportedly "defines the boundary between the overlapping theories of
tort law and contract law ... particularly in . . . negligence cases."54 As

one court recently stated, "The purpose of the rule is to strike an equitable balance between countervailing public policies[] that exist in tort and
contracts law." 55 The rule is thought by its proponents to honor the volitional ordering of essentially private obligations that arise by consent by
barring the recovery of purely economic loss in tort.56 Contemporary
legal taxonomists thus claim that if a breach of contract gives rise to economic harm absent manifested physical injury, then the "pure" economic
nature of the injury is a reliable means to distinguish a contract claim
from one in tort.
Once again, however, inherent in these platitudes are unadorned fallacies. First, the economic loss rule is not always invoked to honor the
ordering of private, voluntarily assumed obligations. Instead, the rule is
used frequently as a substitute for a difficult "proximate cause" analysis
to determine the scope of liability in cases involving garden-variety negligence that causes far-reaching economic harm (arising out of the performance of contractual duties or otherwise).57 In this context, the "rule"
is an arbitrary pretext for principle that is grounded in a desire for ease of
judicial administration.

54. Dean v. Barrett Homes, Inc., 968 A.2d 192, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2009) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering,48 ARIz. L.
REV. 813, 814 (2006) ("[C]ases [implicating the rule] originate[] ... in a contract entered into by the
defendant and its contracting partner. The defendant and its partner have allocated the risks and
benefits of performance in their contract, and the court upsets that allocation when it imposes liability on the defendant. Imposing such liability outside the contract is unfair to the defendant, who has
ordered its affairs on the expectations created in the contract, and undermines the process of contracting. Although there are other justifications for the rule, the argument about private ordering is
primary. . . . The logic of private ordering is, of course, the logic of contract law: individuals are the
best judges of their own interests; individuals maximize those interests through contracts; the expectation and reliance interests created by contracts deserve protection; promoting private contracting
produces a social benefit; contract law provides the framework through which the individual and
social benefits are realized in practice. In economic loss cases, private ordering is advanced when
courts recognize contract law as the primary structure for regulating relationships. Applying tort law,
on the other hand, could upset the parties' private ordering. As a result, recovery is allowed only
within the bounds of contract law. . . ."); see also id. at 817 n.23 ("Other elements of the rationale
for the economic loss rule include avoiding indeterminate liability, the difficulty in measuring fault,
causation, and damages, the adequacy of other remedies in providing deterrence, and preserving the
defendant's assets for the most deserving victims." (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON.

TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006))).
57. See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 715 (2006) (arguing that the "stranger economic loss rule" is justified in a complex society where "[s]tand-alone economic loss often spreads without limit").
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The latter observation was essentially conceded by the Fifth Circuit
in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank." The injured parties argued
that "[t]he [economic loss rule] is arbitrary, unfair, and illogical, as it
denies recovery for foreseeable injury caused by negligent acts."5 9
In response, the court demurred:
Those who would delete the requirement of physical damage have
no rule or principle to substitute. Their approach fails to recognize
limits upon the adjudicating ability of courts. We do not mean just
the ability to supply a judgment; prerequisite to this adjudicatory
function are preexisting rules, whether the creature of courts or legislatures. Courts can decide cases without preexisting normative guidance but the result becomes less judicial and more the product of a
managerial, legislative or negotiated function.

... Plaintiffs point to seemingly perverse results, where claims the
rule allows and those it disallows are juxtaposed ... . The answer is

that when lines are drawn sufficiently sharp in their definitional edges to be reasonable and predictable, such differing results are the inevitable result-indeed, decisions are the desired product. 60
Conceptions of judicial efficiency may be thought by some to compel limiting the scope of the liability of actors who cause widespread
harm in a crowded, industrialized society to damages for physical harm
(and consequential economic loss). But in attempts to apply the distinctions required by the economic loss rule as between contracting parties,
the utter incoherencies of the rule are disturbingly apparent.
For whatever the merits of the economic loss rule when used to
foreclose liability in tort to third parties not physically injured as a result
of a negligent breach of a contract with another, the rule intolerably fails
to reliably identify whether a negligent breach of contract should be adjudicated according to the principles of tort or contract law in a dispute
between the parties to the agreement. The economic loss rule is patently
incongruous when considered in the latter context. As the court explained in Moransaisv. Heathman6
[T]he economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited, value
in our damages law, [but was never] intended to bar well-established
common law causes of action, such as those for neglect in providing

58.
59.
60.
61.

752 F.2d 1019, 1030 (5th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1028-29.
744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
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professional services.. .. The rule, in any case, should not be invoked to bar well-established causes of actions in tort .... 62
The Moransaiscourt correctly alluded to an entire body of tort law
that pertains precisely to recovery for purely economic loss arising out of
negligently performed contractual duties.63 Any attempt to wall recovery
of negligently caused "pure economic loss" arising out of contractual
services within the bounds of contract law necessarily fails. Attempts by
courts to do so inevitably lead to even more inconsistencies and consequent incoherency in the application of the economic loss rule.
For example, not much more than a decade ago, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was called upon to decide whether the economic loss rule precludes viewing attorney malpractice as a tort.64 An
attorney's client argued that legal malpractice that causes purely economic harm gives rise to an action sounding solely in contract in order to
avoid the attorney's defense based on the client's alleged comparative
negligence. 6 5 Remarkably, in 1998, the court labeled the question "unanswered" by precedent. 66
In response to this classification gambit, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts first noted that it had never applied "the economic loss
rule to claims of negligence by a fiduciary, such as a lawyer."67 The court
62.
Id. at 983 (footnote omitted). In Moransais, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that
our pronouncements on the [economic loss] rule have not always been clear and, accordingly, have
been the subject of legitimate criticism and commentary." Id. at 980. The court found that, as a
consequence, courts in Florida had "[u]nfortunately" extended the economic loss doctrine "beyond
its principled origins and .. . appli[ed] the rule ... well beyond our original intent." Id. In order to
avoid precluding traditional and well-established actions in tort, the Moransaiscourt limited future
application of the economic loss rule generally to the product liability context or to situations where
the policy considerations are substantially identical to those underlying its "product liability-type
analysis." Id. at 983; see also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F.
Supp. 2d 108, 126-27 (D. Me. 2009) (holding that customers had stated a claim in tort for alleged
negligence in handling electronic payment data because economic loss rule was restricted to product
liability cases).
63. See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 984 ("[W]e again emphasize that by recognizing that the
economic loss rule may have some genuine, but limited, value in our damages law, we never intended to bar well-established common law causes of action.").
64. See Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998).
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id. Professor Dan B. Dobbs agrees that lawyers and other fiduciaries should be liable in
tort for negligent performance, and he would foreclose contractual disclaimers in such cases as
follows:
[B]ases for subjecting lawyers and perhaps some other professionals to negligence liability do indeed exist. When you retain someone for the express purpose of being on your
side, he cannot rightly contract to be your adversary instead or to be on your side but free
to be negligent. This suggests that contract limits on lawyer liability for negligence would
be inappropriate. That is not the whole story, because lawyers can limit the scope of their
representation by contract, but it is enough to justify holding lawyers and fiduciaries liable in negligence and foreclosing any broad self-exculpatory contract.
That line of reasoning does not apply to all services, so you can say that while professionals may not readily limit their liability to clients by contract, other service providers might well be allowed to do so. Yet, for non-professional service providers it would
be more in line with contractual autonomy to ask what the parties actually provided, ex-
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could not leave the matter at that, however. To be sure, the Massachusetts courts had imputed a duty "enforceable in law" to carefully perform
services that are likely to cause only economic harm in instances involving a service by one who owes a fiduciary duty. Yet, a breach of professional standards by an attorney does not always give rise to a fully realized remedy in tort for breach of fiduciary duty,68 and attorney malpractice does not always entail a breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts could not elide
the question presented by the attorney's client. The client asked the court
to decide whether the economic loss rule applies in cases arising out of
legal services likely from the outset to cause only economic harm if negligently performed. The court rejected the client's claimed immunity

pressly or impliedly, rather than to determine by a rule of law that none of them can be liable for negligence.
Dobbs, supra note 57, at 727-28. Unfortunately, the means suggested by Professor Dobbs to distinguish tort from contract liability is too vague to be of much practical benefit. Deciding what service
providers are "on your side" is a rather nebulous standard. For example, auditors are usually required
to take no side other than the truth, yet, their misfeasance is considered a tort, sometimes even as to
third parties. Moreover, reference to "lawyers and perhaps some other professionals" is intelligible
to only a self-referential elite. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts correctly considered
nearly all trades in parity with "professionals" when stating the applicable standard of care in tort.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, (1965) ("Skill ... is something more than the mere
minimum competence required of any person who does an act .... It is that special form of competence which is not part of the ordinary equipment of the reasonable man, but which is the result of
acquired learning, and aptitude developed by special training and experience. All professions, and
most trades, are necessarily skilled, and the word is used to refer to the special competence which
they require."). Wisely, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical & EmotionalHarm thus provides
that "[i]f an actor has skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others, these skills or
knowledge are circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether the actor has behaved
as a reasonably careful person." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 12

(2010). As the American Law Institute authors explain, "This Section can be easily applied to
cases involving the liability of professionals," but it is not limited thereto. Id. § 12, cmt. a (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 299A).

Defining negligent services as tortious based on the

identity of an actor as a "professional" at long last should be rejected outright; it is, at best, problematic and vague, and, at worst, an inappropriate throwback to outdated notions of noblesse oblige.
68. See, e.g., Medina v. Bryk, No. FBT-CV-5008762-S, 2007 WL 4754990, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2007) ("Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has never expressly limited
the application of claims of breach of fiduciary duty to those involving fraud, self-dealing or conflict
of interest, all of the cases decided by the court have involved such egregious deviations from proper
and ethical conduct. Superior Courts which have considered the issue have further limited the type of
conflict of interest which will give rise to a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty to those involving
self-dealing. No cause of action [in tort for emotional distress] has been recognized, when the claims
involve a breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in the absence of self-dealing or actions
placing the interest of the attorney above those of the client." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
69. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289-90 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) ("While legal malpractice actions based on breach of contract are conceptually distinct, legal
malpractice actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are more difficult to differentiate.... [A]n attorney's fiduciary duty is two-fold: undivided loyalty and confidentiality. An attorney's failure to provide undivided loyalty to a client does not necessarily mean that an attorney has
performed legal services negligently. . . . Legal malpractice based on negligence concerns violations
of a standard of care; whereas, legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty concerns violations of a standard of conduct. Breach of fiduciary duty, therefore, provides a basis for legal malpractice separate and apart from professional negligence." (citations omitted)).
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from tort defenses in such a case and approved a standard broad enough
to nearly destroy the economic loss rule in like circumstances:
[A] defendant owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to
avoid the risk of causing economic damages, aside from physical injury, to particular plaintiffs or plaintiffs comprising an identifiable
class [who] defendant knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer such damages from its conduct. A defendant failing to adhere to
this duty of care may be found liable [in tort] for such economic
damages proximately caused by its breach of duty.70
Defining tort liability for economic loss in terms that measure the
scope of the risk created by a defendant's conduct is a fulsome capitulation to logic that displaces the economic loss rule as a means to distinguish a breach of contract from a tort. The negligent breach of almost
any contract to perform services (such as construction services) will foreseeably cause economic loss. 7 ' The standard recognized by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts might adequately resolve a "scope of
liability" problem in some cases by reference to a foreseeable class of
injured parties, but that standard does not reliably distinguish negligently
performed services that give rise to a cause of action in tort for economic
harm from those that do not.
Against this backdrop, in 2004, the American Law Institute (AID72
set out to "restate" tort law governing economic losses in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Economic Torts and Related Wrongs.73 The second draft of this proposed Restatement adopted a rule not entirely unlike
the standard accepted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Clark v. Rowe.74 That rule provided that an actor owes a duty of care to
another to avoid negligently inflicted economic harm when the actor
,'75
11
"appears to invite the other to rely on the actor to render a service ....
In the view of some, this formulation adequately .'mediate[d] between
70.
Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626-29 (Mass. 1998) (quoting People Express Airlines,
Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985)); see also People Express Airlines, 495
A.2d at 118 ("[E]conomic losses are recoverable as damages when they are the natural and probable
consequence of a defendant's negligence in the sense that they are . . . demonstrably within the risk
created by defendant's negligence.").
71.
See, e.g., Landwehr v. Citizens Trust Co., 329 N.W.2d 411, 413-14 (Wis. 1983) ("[Plaintiffj contends 'that there [should] be liability in tort whenever ... misperformance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the plaintiff.' We agree with the courts below
that this theory, which focuses on foreseeability . . . would destroy the distinction between tort and
contract, since some kind of foreseeable injury or damage is present in virtually all contractual
breaches." (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 617-18 (4th ed. 1971)).
72.
"The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States
producing scholarly work to clarify, modemize, and otherwise improve the law." THE AM. LAW
INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cftn?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
73.
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74.
Feinman, supra note 56, at 818-19.
75.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS

nary Draft No. 2, 2006) quoted in Feinman, supra note 56, at 819.
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the rules of tort liability for physical harm and the rules of contract liability," owing to the required relation to another and numerous proposed
exceptions to the primary rule. Unfortunately, those exceptions prescribed taxonomic distinctions nearly impossible to apply in practice.7 7
Professor Mark F. Gergen was the reporter for this project. By December 2007, he stepped down. The second draft failed to garner sufficient support. As Professor Gergen explained in his letter of resignation:
I presented Council Draft No. 2 covering much of the field of economic negligence. There was strong disagreement voiced at the meeting about the direction taken in the draft. The draft states the law of
economic negligence (and in particular negligent misrepresentation)
in terms that emphasize its relation to contract law and that distinguish the law of economic negligence from accident law involving
physical harm. The criticism was that the law of economic negligence should be situated within a general tort of negligence .... 78
76. See Feinman, supra note 56, at 819. In 2006, Professor Feinman argued that the breadth
suggested by the primary rule was tempered by several exceptions deferential to contractual relations
in that
[iun a number of circumstances, the general principle of section 9(2) is explicitly
subordinated to private ordering. First, the principle does not apply if an actor "effectively disclaims liability." Second, when the invitation to rely comes in the course of performing a contract governed by an integrated document, the parol evidence rule trumps
what might otherwise be a duty of care. Third, there is no duty of care when "the actor's
obligation to the plaintiff is resolved by another body of law," which includes contract
law. "Resolved by" apparently does not mean "provides a remedy for," but rather "addresses the issue," which would result in no liability in many cases. Fourth, "a tort action
usually is unnecessary" when "the plaintiff could obtain redress for the harm by contract
from the actor or an intermediate party."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 9(3)(c) (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2006)); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liabilityfor Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 764-65 (2006) (discussing Jane Stapleton's view that tort
liability can be precluded when contract law regulates an actor's unreasonable conduct or is available to prevent or redress the alleged harm).
77. See Feinman, supra note 56, at 819 (noting that an exception from the primary rule provided that "there is no duty of care when the actor's obligation to the plaintiff is resolvedby another
body of law" (emphasis added)). Stating that tort law applies when contract law does not "resolve[]"
the matter is not a workable standard because it provides no normative guidance whatsoever. If a
contract "addresses the issue" in dispute by "effectively disclaim[ing] liability" in tort or provides
"redress" so limited that the outcome will be "no liability in many cases," then yet another standard
will be necessary to test the validity of such provisions to preserve tort liability in a wide range of
cases. Contra id.; Gergen, supra note 76, at 768, 771 (recognizing that in certain cases absent tort
liability alternative means may be inadequate to "deter unreasonable conduct, or to prevent or redress the [alleged] harm," allowing that in such instances a court might "weigh[] the need for tort
liability against concerns about its efficacy," and accepting that "the particular balance struck [might
vary based] on institutional and social considerations, legal culture, judicial philosophy, and judicial
temperament").
78. Bruce Feldthusen, What the United States Taught the Commonwealth About Pure Economic Loss: Time To Repay the Favor,38 PEPP. L. REv. 309, 319-20 (2011); see also Gergen, supra
note 2, at 4-5 (explaining his resignation, Professor Gergen stated: "[My] taxonomic claim [regarding negligent misrepresentation] goes to the heart of a disagreement between me and some other
participants in the American Law Institute project on Economic Torts that led to my resignation as
Reporter for the project. They think the law of negligent misrepresentation (or negligent misstatement, as it is known elsewhere in the common law world) is best understood as part of negligence
law. [I don't.] Taxonomy matters.").
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The so recent inability of a group of scholars so prominent as these
to agree on a question of the taxonomy of legal claims so basic tells us a
great deal about the inability of contemporary legal taxonomy to serve
the interests of those who are so considerably affected by its inadequacies.
Despite the "strong disagreement" to which Professor Gergen referred in his letter of resignation, the circulated draft garnered some expectable support notably from stalwarts of economic loss theory. For
example, Professor Bruce Feldthusen, who has focused his research and
writing on the economic loss rule for more than thirty-five years, described the debate in the following terms:
Professor Gergen resigned over a fundamental disagreement as to
whether the distinction between economic loss and physical damage
was justified, and whether the close relationship between economic
loss cases and contract law, in which Professor Gergen believed, actually existed. Having attended some of the American Law Institute
meetings, I can tell you that those who saw economic negligence as a
wrinkle on the general law of physical damage negligence law believed equally that it is productive to group all negligence cases together and to resolve them with reference to high level principles rather than relatively clear rules that apply in easily identified categories of cases. Of course I believe this is a totally misguided approach. 79
Professor Feldthusen's conclusion about the misguided nature of
unifying themes in the common law may be a triumph of academic aspirations over real world experience. His observation that pure economic
loss and its relation to contract law is "easily identified" is demonstrably
belied by the cases.
For however sincere some scholars (and courts) may be in implicit
assurances to the contrary, views about "pure economic harm" that
prominent and respected contemporary legal theorists like Professors
Gergen and Feldthusen propound would wreak havoc in the common law
if ever fully implemented.80 Attempts to codify rules to reliably distinguish contract from tort claims based on whether a claim is for solely
economic loss cannot and will not succeed. The cases are just too incongruent to "easily" distinguish those circumstances in which courts will
79.
Feldthusen, supranote 78, at 320 (emphasis added).
80. As stated by the dissent in Aas: "[T]hose courts [that] have addressed [the economic loss
rule] from ... a commonsense perspective ... have reached conclusions very different from that
adopted by the majority in the present case. ... [TI]he majority today embraces a ruling that offends
both established common law and basic common sense." Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1143
(Cal. 2000) (George, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999) ("If the [economic loss] doctrine were genuinely applied to bar
all tort claims for economic losses without accompanying personal injury or property damage, the
rule would wreak havoc on the common law of torts." (citing Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss
Rule Outbreak: The Monster That Ate Commercial Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (1995)).
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permit recovery in tort based on a breach of contract that causes only
economic harm from those in which courts will not, as the court in Aas
so cogently demonstrated. 8'
In practice, fluctuating classifications result in fluctuating remedies.
For example, one can recover in tort for emotional distress arising out of
the negligence of a notary that causes "pure economic loss" 82 but not for
emotional distress that arises out of a veterinarian's negligence that causes physical harm (e.g., the death of a cat or dog). 83 The latter result may
be the same even if the veterinarian intentionally causes the death of
one's beloved pet, and yet, punitive damages might be awarded. 8 4
In sum, one cannot help but be amazed by the volume of conflicting
and contradictory precedent governing the matter of distinguishing tort
from contact theory in cases involving the rendering of services. Some
courts are so completely befuddled by the illogical distinctions swirling
around them that they cannot keep the supposed taxa distinct and in the
final analysis misapply the putative taxonomic rules of recovery without
85
any legitimate basis for deviation owing seemingly to pure confusion.
Aas, 12 P.3d at 1143. Compare City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 840
81.
(Haw. 1998) (holding that recovery of pure economic loss for professional negligence of architect is
precluded), with Robinson Redevelopment Co. v. Anderson, 547 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (App. Div.
1989) (holding that recovery of pure economic loss for professional negligence of architect is not
precluded). See Peter Benson, The Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 824-825
(2009) ("[B]oth defenders and critics of the traditional bar against recovery [in tort for pure economic loss] share the assumption that it cannot be justified on the basis of ordinary principles of negligence. They take as given that these principles would allow recovery in the very circumstances
where courts have consistently denied it. The rationale must lie elsewhere. Thus pure economic loss
claims are to be governed by a special rule-the 'economic loss rule.' On this view, economic loss
represents a distinct topic within tort law that apparently raises its own special policy considerations
and concerns.").
82. See, e.g., Webb v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 530 So. 2d 115, 118-119 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (holding negligent notary liable for emotional distress damages); McComber v. Wells, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 376, 379 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding negligent notary liable for emotional distress damages).
83. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Animals, 4 AM. JUR. § 116 (2d ed. 2012) ("Most jurisdictions
deny recovery of damages for emotional distress arising from injury or death of animals caused by
ordinary negligence on the ground that animals are, at common law, and sometimes by statute,
deemed personal property."); McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 563 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that a contract between veterinarian and owner to treat Tootsie [the dog] did not demonstrate that
defendants undertook a duty to protect owner's mental and emotional tranquility (citing Selden v.
Dinner, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 153, 158-59 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a duty to protect patient's emotional health does not arise by virtue of physician-patient relationship))); see also Erlich v. Menezes,
981 P.2d 978, 982 (Cal. 1999) ("The[] uncertain boundaries and the apparent breadth of the recovery
available for tort actions create pressure to obliterate the distinction between contracts and torts-an
expansion of tort law at the expense of contract principles which Grant Gilmore aptly dubbed 'contorts.' In this case we consider whether a negligent breach of a contract will support an award of
damages for emotional distress . . .. [I]s the mere negligent breach of a contract sufficient? The
answer is no.").
84. See, e.g., Scheele v. Dustin, 998 A.2d 697, 701 (Vt. 2010) (surveying authority from
several jurisdictions, court adopts nearly universal rule and denies plaintiffs' recovery for emotional
damages for the intentional killing of their pet dog but postulates that punitive damages may be
"available to a party who has suffered from an intentional ... tort").
85. See, e.g., Boone v. C. Arthur Weaver Co., 365 S.E.2d 764, 766 (Va. 1988) (reasoning that
because there would have been no duty to a client in the absence of a contract, the court applied the
contract statute of limitations to a tort action based on professional negligence).
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The types of harm that "traditionally" have been compensable in
tort are not carved in immutable stone tablets. The failure to have derived
coherent taxa to reliably describe legally cognizable claims and available
remedies arising out of a conceded harm not only deprives litigants of
remedies based on steady principles but also speaks volumes about the
likely success of building on the shaky foundation of archaic doctrinal
distinctions.86 A legal structure able to provide a more coherent and predictable forum for adjudicating rights and remedies is sorely required.
B. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability; A Useful but
PiecemealMeasure to Abjure ContemporaryLegal Taxonomy
If regulating the boundary between tort and contract theory is challenging in the area of service contracts, doing so has proved even more
maddening in the area of liability arising out of the defective manufacture of consumer goods. The legal theory of liability applicable to claims
by a consumer injured by a defectively made chattel is a matter of impressive juridical vagueness and striking sidestepping by courts and legislatures. Perhaps no aspect of the legal canon in contemporary America
demonstrates better the futility of parsing claims based on faulty taxonomic distinctions.
To get a sense of the conflicting precedents governing "product liability," consider the frustration evident in this passage, penned by a judge
trying to make sense of the nonsensical patchwork of state law in the
United States prevailing at the outset of the twenty-first century:
In [New York], a products liability plaintiff may sue in negligence,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express warranty, strict liability in tort, as well as intentional or negligent misrepresentation. In [Connecticut, Kansas, Oregon, or Washington], that
same plaintiff would have only a single cause of action under the
state products liability act. Somewhere else, such as Indiana, that
identical plaintiff could sue in negligence or strict liability but not
warranty, while a few miles away in Michigan, he or she could only
87
sue in negligence or warranty.
These confused and contradictory precedents are directly attributable to the uncertain but relentless morphing in fits and starts of tort and
contract theory. As the legatees of Prosser's famous torts casebook state:
86. See Current Projects, Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, AM. LAW
INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction-projects.proj ip&projectid=15 (last visited Nov. 10,
2012) ("[The] project [which resumed in 2010] will focus on torts that involve economic loss, or
pecuniary harm not resulting from physical harm or physical contact to a person or property. The
project will update coverage of economic torts in Restatement Second, Torts and address some
topics not covered in prior Restatements.").
87.
Drooger v. Carlisle Tire & Wheel Co., No. 1:05-CV-73, 2006 WL 1008719, at *7 (W.D.
Mich. Apr. 18, 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting Fisher v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 181
F.R.D. 365, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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"[An] action by the buyer of goods against the seller for breach of warranty is a hybrid, 'born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract,' and
partaking the characteristics of both."8 8 They further note:
Originally the action was in tort, in an action of trespass on the case
for breach of an assumed duty, and the wrong was conceived to be a
form of misrepresentation, in the nature of deceit, and not at all clearly distinguished from it.

. ..

In the latter part of the seventeenth cen-

tury, decisions ... established the fact that the tort action would lie
for an affirmation of fact ("express warranty"), even one made
without knowledge of its falsity and without negligence. . . .
In [1778], it was first held that assumpsit would lie for breach of
an express warranty as a part of the contract of sale. After that decision, and over a period of more than a century, warranties gradually
came to be regarded as express or implied terms of the contract of
sale, and the action on the contract became the usual remedy for any
breach.89
Since the end of the nineteenth century, tort theory gradually has
come to play an important role again with respect to liability for defectively made chattels. 90 But, as noted above, old theories do not die, and
they do not even fade away. Instead, a party injured by a defective prod-

uct in most jurisdictions today must choose from an awkward, confusing,
and sometimes conflicting array of "causes of action" to plead her case.
The consequence of this accumulation of legal theories is not of simply
or solely academic interest: the wrong choice of theory by a litigant or
the court may result in no recovery at all for injuries caused by a defectively manufactured chattel.
In 1998, the authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability discernibly moved toward recognizing a true uniform canon
governing liability arising out of defectively manufactured chattels. 9' The
black-letter rule of product liability proposed by this Restatement prescribes liability based on a "functional" analysis that abandons doctrinal

88.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 748 (12th ed. 2010).
89. Id. at 748-49.
90.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. a (1998) ("In the late 1800s,
courts in many states began imposing negligence and strict warranty liability on commercial sellers
of defective goods. In the early 1960s, American courts began to recognize that a commercial seller
of any product having a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort for harm caused by the defect
regardless of the plaintiffs ability to maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action. . . . Strict
liability in tort for defectively manufactured products merges the concept of implied warranty, in
which negligence is not required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which contractual privity is
not required.")
91. See id § I ("One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the defect.").
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distinctions between tort and contract law in favor of liability based on
categories of product defect. As the ALI explains:
[P]roducts liability is a discrete area of tort law which borrows from
both negligence and warranty. It is not fully congruent with classical
tort or contract law. Rather than perpetuating confusion spawned by
existing doctrinal categories, [this Restatement] define[s] the liability
for each form of defect in terms directly addressing the various kinds
of defects. As long as these functional criteria are met, courts may
utilize the terminology of negligence, strict liability, or the implied
warranty of merchantability, or simply define liability in the terms set
forth in the black letter. 92
This praiseworthy effort to locate the source of liability for defectively made products in the operative facts, while leaving to the courts
the prerogative to classify a claim however they please, is consonant with
other efforts by the ALI to begin the process of abandoning the artificial
and unworkable doctrinal categories that haunt the legal canon in the
United States. 9 3 However, laudable as may be the efforts by the ALI authors to simplify substantive claims arising out of the defective manufacture of chattels, the liability regime they recommend regrettably continues to distinguish "pure economic loss" from "physical harm" and consigns claims of "economic loss traditionally excluded from the realm of
tort law" to the law of contracts (here, the Uniform Commercial Code)thereby perpetuating the very confusion caused by the existing doctrinal
categories of claims that the authors sought to avoid at the outset. 94
The authors of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
specify three categories of economic loss that cannot be recovered under
the unified theory of product liability. The first category is consequential
economic loss (unaccompanied by physical harm) owing to the failure of
a product to perform; 95 the second is loss owing to the need to replace a
92.
Id. § I cmt. a.
93.
For example, the ALl has taken a major step toward supplanting archaic doctrinal distinctions with respect to the apportionment of liability. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 1, cmt. b (2000) ("This Restatement applies to all claims to recover
compensation for death, personal injury, or physical damage to tangible property, including intentional torts, negligence, strict liability, nuisance, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, or any other
theory of liability.").
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. d. (1998) ("The rule stated in
this Section applies only to harm to persons or property, commonly referred to as personal injury and
property damage. For rules governing economic loss, see § 21."); id. § 21 cmt. a. ("This Section
limits the kinds of harm for which recovery is available under this Restatement. Two major constraints on tort recovery give content to this Section. First, products liability law lies at the boundary
between tort and contract. Some categories of loss, including those often referred to as 'pure economic loss,' are more appropriately assigned to contract law and the remedies set forth in Articles 2
and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. ... Second, some forms of economic loss have traditionally been excluded from the realm of tort law even when the plaintiff has no contractual remedy for a
claim.").
95. Id. § 21 cmt. d. ("Such a defect may also result in consequential loss to the buyer. For
example, a machine that becomes inoperative may cause the assembly line in which it is being used
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product that poses a risk of physical harm that has not yet occurred; 96 and
the third is economic loss caused by physical harm that affects only the
product. 97
Despite vigorous defense by some courts" and scholars,99 these
rules cannot be applied with any regularity. To the contrary, these are
precisely the sort of taxonomic guidelines that compel pointless efforts to
classify claims by the nature of the remedies sought.
For example, advocates of the economic loss rule argue that rejecting a claim in tort for the costs to repair a structure that suffers from "an
internal construction defect" is necessary to respect contractual allocations of loss in the commercial context.100 Yet, as the authors of the Reto break down and may lead to a wide range of consequential economic losses to the business that
owns the machine. These losses are not recoverable in tort under the rules of this Restatement.").
96. Id. ("A somewhat more difficult question is presented when the defect in the product
renders it unreasonably dangerous, but the product does not cause harm to persons or property.... A
plausible argument can be made that products that are dangerous, rather than merely ineffectual,
should be governed by the rules governing products liability law. However, a majority of courts have
concluded that the remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code-repair and replacement
costs and, in appropriate circumstances, consequential economic loss-are sufficient. Thus, the rules
of this Restatement do not apply in such situations.").
97. Id. §21 cmt. e ("A defective product that causes harm to property other than the defective
product itself is governed by the rules of this Restatement. What constitutes harm to other property
rather than harm to the product itself may be difficult to determine. A product that nondangerously
fails to function due to a product defect has clearly caused harm only to itself. A product that fails to
function and causes harm to surrounding property has clearly caused harm to other property. However, when a component part of a machine or a system destroys the rest of the machine or system,
the characterization process becomes more difficult. When the product or system is deemed to be an
integrated whole, courts treat such damage as harm to the product itself. When so characterized, the
damage is excluded from the coverage of this Restatement. A contrary holding would require a
finding of property damage in virtually every case in which a product harms itself and would prevent
contractual rules from serving their legitimate function in governing commercial transactions.").
98. The California Supreme Court explained the operation of the economic loss rule in the
context of product liability as follows:
Economic loss consists of "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement
of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." Simply stated, the economic loss rule provides:
"[W]here a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he
bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only economic losses. This doctrine hinges on a distinction drawn between transactions involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic expectations
are protected by commercial and contract law, and those involving the sale of defective
products to individual consumers who are injured in a manner which has traditionally
been remedied by resort to the law of torts." . . . Quite simply, the economic loss rule
"prevent[s] the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other."
Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268, 272-73 (Cal. 2004) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 456 (Cal.
2004), Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 615 (Mich. 1992), and Rich
Products Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969 (E.D. Wis.1999), respectively).
99.
Feldthusen, supra note 78, at 319 ("Indeed, the U.S. product liability cases are among the
most impressive of all judicial decisions in explaining the distinctions between economic loss and
physical damage.").
100.

Id. at 314-16 ("[I1n . .. the product liability field . . . pure economic loss ...

refers to a

claim to recover the cost of repairing or replacing a product or structure that suffers from an internal
manufacturing or construction defect.... [T]he ... rule [denying recovery in this circumstance] is
based on respect for contractual allocations of risk primarily in commercial law.").
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statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability acknowledge, there is a
glaring exception to the economic loss rule in product liability cases involving the incorporation of asbestos-containing materials in buildings. 0 1
In such cases, the only arguable loss is the depreciated value of a
building owing to the risk of future harmful release of asbestos fibers.
Recovery in tort for the costs of remediation in such cases ostensibly
should be precluded by that aspect of the economic loss rule expressed
by the Restatement that purportedly governs cases involving the need to
replace a product that poses a risk of physical harm that has not yet occurred. And yet, such recovery is usually allowed. Courts have held that
the mere incorporation of asbestos-containing materials constitutes
"physical harm" to a building, even if the asbestos is not "friable"-even
if it is stable in situ and poses no immediate risk of physical harm to the
building or its users.102
The troubling nature of this "asbestos exception" from the economic
loss rule is illustrated dramatically by comparing the outcome in the asbestos cases with the outcome in other cases involving the risk of bodily
injury arising out of negligently made products. Courts are less solicitous
of claims by a person who might die instantly as a result of the anticipated failure of a presently functioning but allegedly defective heart valvel 03
or who might be seriously injured when the risk of collapse or fire created by the negligent manufacture of a home is finally realized.'" Anomalous and unfair distinctions like these-all in the name of an untrustworthy and completely unnecessary doctrinal purity-abound.

101.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.

§

21 cmt. e (acknowledging the

exception).
102.
See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 73 OR. L. REV.
505, 530 (1994) ("Because property owners seek reimbursement for abatement expenses (economic
harm) rather than compensation for structural damage to their buildings (physical damage), one
would expect courts to consider only contract remedies, at least in jurisdictions that adhere to the
'physical injury' rule of tort law. In fact, most courts have done just the opposite, freely allowing
property owners to sue in tort by adopting a 'liberal' definition of physical injury.").
103.
See Khan v. Shiley Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 106, 110 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that despite
plaintiff's claim that her implanted heart valve was defective because the valve was allegedly unreasonably prone to fracture and end her life instantly upon failure, plaintiff could state no tort claim
until the implanted heart valve actually malfunctioned, leaving plaintiff only the possibility of posthumous vindication).
104. See Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1140 (Cal. 2000) ("[W]hether the economic loss
rule applies depends on whether property damage has occurred rather than on the possible gravity of
damages that have not yet occurred."). In his dissenting opinion, the Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court stated:
Other courts faced with the question we address today have asked: Why should a
homeowner have to wait for a personal tragedy to occur in order to recover damages to
repair known serious building code safety defects caused by negligent construction? ...
[T]hose courts [that] have addressed the matter from such a commonsense perspective
... have reached conclusions very different from that adopted by the majority in the present case.
Id. at 1143 (George, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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III. THE FIN DE SItCLE AND NEAR ELIMINATION OF THE DOCTRINAL
DISTINCTIONS UPON WHICH CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY

RELIES
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, dysfunctional outcomes invariably follow the formalistic application of the most salient
contemporary doctrinal distinctions. Attempts to delineate the boundaries
between contract and tort law are especially ineffectual. The true question in such cases is the choice of available remedies for a legally cognizable breach of obligation and not one of drawing capricious taxonomic lines in the sand to dictate relief therefor.'0 5
Tellingly, challenges arising out of the contemporary. taxonomy of
legal claims are rooted in competing crosscurrents of legal theory debated both in the United States and England during period from the midnineteenth until the early twentieth century (generally, the fin de sidcle).
During this period, three salutary developments nearly put an end to
then-nascent efforts to institute the doctrinal classification of legal claims
known today.
First, a movement to unify the courts of law and equity succeeded.106 Second, newly propounded "codes of civil procedure" sought to
divorce completely the art of pleading from the substance and merit of
underlying claims.' 0 7 Third, and perhaps most importantly, legal scholars
offered an elegant theory of primary rights that would have put into practice in earnest an iteration of the old Roman maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium. 08 Each of these developments will be considered below in turn.
A. The Mergerof the CourtsofLaw andEquity
During the fin de si~cle, a merger of the courts of law and equity in
the United States put at risk a nascent form of the legal taxonomy known
today. Prior to this merger, the branched court system that predominated
in England was adopted by its colonies in North America and carried on
after they formed the United States.1 09 Apprehending the impetus for the

105. The dissent in Aas properly framed the fundamental question the majority elided: "What
remedy is there [arising out of a negligently constructed home] when there is no privity, and hence
there are no contract rights, or when there is privity, but disclaimers or technical notice rules preclude enforcement of contract rights ... ?" Id. at 153.
106. See, e.g., City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257 (1949) ("The coalescing of law and equity procedure was completed [in the federal courts] in 1938 .... ); Marcus, supra
note 2, at 476-77 (noting that, beginning in 1848, the New York state legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code of civil procedure that abolished the formal distinction between law and equity).
107. See infra Part IlI.B.
108. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.
109. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777, 783-84
(2004) ("At the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of
action was generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in
equity afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance. ... Most of the states that ratified
the Constitution adopted in some measure the common law of England. Thus, to discern what the
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merger of the courts of law and equity in the United States uncovers the
risks that merger posed to the contemporary classification of legal claims
and requires a brief overview of the reasons the bifurcated English judicial system arose.
Although the history of legal taxonomy stretches back at least to
Ancient Rome, 110 efforts to classify legal claims into forms of action
known as writs reached an apogee in the medieval English courts of law.
In these courts, rigid and inflexible rules of pleading and procedure precluded relief for conceded wrongs based on a hidebound taxonomy of
claims. Immediately preceding the American Revolution, any plea "at
law" was subject to such strict scrutiny that the inability to fit a claim or
defense within the tightly prescribed writs (developed over at least five
centuries) resulted in no relief at all. 1 In other words, taxonomy was not
relevant: it was determinative.
In the English courts of law from the late eighteenth until the early
nineteenth century, "a plaintiff had a cause of action . . . only if judicial

relief was available through a particular form of proceeding. Each form
of proceeding carried with it unique procedural incidents, a particular
form of relief, and specific forms of judgment and execution." 1 2 Thus,
although the English courts at this time sometimes paid deference to the
Latin maxim ubijus, ibi remedium, that deference was entirely illusory:
It is true that Bracton wrote in the thirteenth century that "[t]here may
be as many forms of actions as there are causes of action," suggesting, as F.W. Maitland puts it, that "[t]here ought to be a remedy for
term cause of action denoted in American law during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it is useful to begin with what it denoted in English law during that time period.").
110. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1234 (2001) ("The
structure originally established for Roman law by the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, and thereafter
generally followed by the writers in the civilian tradition, was roughly as follows. Public law (including criminal law) was distinguished from private law, and later came to be largely ignored by
the post-medieval civilians, for whom Roman law essentially meant Roman private law. Private law
was then divided into three basic categories: the law of persons (status), the law of things, and the
law of actions (remedies and procedure). The widest category, the law of things, was further divided
into bodies of law governing property, successions, and obligations. Obligations, finally, were subdivided into those arising out of promise or agreement (ex contractu), and out of wrongs or torts (ex
delicto).").
Ill. See, e.g., Eric A. White, Note, Examining PresidentialPower Through the Rubric of
Equity, 108 MICH. L. REV. 113, 118-19 (2009) ("By [the seventeenth century], the common law
courts had been around a great while, and over the years common law procedure had become increasingly rigid.... Indeed, in some cases litigants could not even manipulate the pleas to get into
common law courts. For such actions as disputes over ordinary contracts, negligence, and nuisance,
there was for a long time simply no common law remedy at all."); Marcus, supra note 2, at 473
("[D]etractors criticized [the writ system] as a 'fossilized formalism.' Common law pleading required that the contours of the forms of action, not practical considerations or concerns of justice,
dictate the boundaries and progress of suits. A nineteenth-century plaintiff, for example, could not
obtain relief unless his claims fit one of what amounted to a fourteenth -century writ. If the plaintiff
chose a writ that did not precisely match the facts at issue, his case would be dismissed, no matter
how meritorious." (quoting CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 51-52 (1897)).
112.
Bellia, supra note 109, at 784.
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every wrong; if some new wrong be perpetrated then a new writ may
be invented to meet it." The subsequent recitation of this phrase
through the centuries left some with the misimpression that at common law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (and at all
times since the Middle Ages) judicial inquiry proceeded by first discerning the existence of a right and then crafting an appropriate remedy for its violation-that, in other words, if . . . a plaintiff could

identify a right that had been invaded, the existence of a cause of action necessarily followed. This was not, however, the mode of judicial proceeding that generally prevailed in the courts of England
around the time of the American Founding... . Ubijus, ibi remedium
was not a black letter legal doctrine; it was merely a platitude." 3
All was not lost, however, for a litigant whose claims could not fit
within the tightly prescribed writs in the English courts of law. A means
to escape from that rigid form of legal taxonomy evolved. Starting as
early as the medieval period, an entirely separate tribunal arose to ameliorate the straightjacketed system of cognizable claims at law. In spite of
the writ system, or perhaps because of it, two court systems developed,
in parallel and sometimes in competition, as many as a thousand years
ago.1 14 Refuge from prevailing rules of practice in the King's courts of
law could be found in the "courts of equity."
The Chancery, a separate court of equity apart from the courts of
law, offered a means to meet the widely acknowledged need to provide
relief in many cases not viable in a system that otherwise failed to afford
it."' To address the taxonomic rigidity of the writ system, a "Chancellor"
in the court of equity was afforded great power and flexibility.116 The
113.
Id.
114.
See, e.g., White, supra note 111, at 113 ("[I]n the eleventh century ... the judicial system
in England was fragmented between an informal court of equity, known as Chancery, and two courts
at common law, known as King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas."); Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
Forewordto SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, at iv (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) ("How absurd for us to
go on until the year 2000 obliging judges and lawyers to climb over a barrier which was put up by
historical accident in 14th century England and built higher by the eagerness of three extinct courts
to keep as much business as possible in their own hands. . . .").
115. See, e.g., Newton v. Aitken, 633 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1ll. App. Ct. 1994) ("An equitable
remedy is not available where there is an adequate remedy at law."); White, supra note Il1 ("The
principle virtue of equity was the flexible escape route it provided. As one seventeenth-century
chancellor put it, equity was necessary because 'men's actions are so diverse and infinite that it is
impossible to make a general law which may aptly meet with every particular and not fail in some
circumstances.' .. . [T]he Court of Chancery .. . had the power to issue new writs and hear actions
'on the case.'... '[T]he chancellor was free from . . . rigid procedures .... His court was a court of
conscience, in which defendants could be coerced into doing whatever conscience required in the
full circumstances of the case."' (quoting J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 106 (4th ed. 2002))).
116. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of
the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it."); David A. Smith, The Error
of Young Cyrus: The Bill of Conformity and Jacobean Kingship, 1603-1624, 28 LAw & HIST. REV.
307, 309 (2010) ("[L]egal historians have frequently commented on the 'triumph' of equity in the
seventeenth century as necessary to remedy the deficiencies in the common law. The equitable
courts of Chancery and Requests departed from the strict course of the common law in order to
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Chancellor's decisions were guided by subjective notions about "right
and wrong"" 7 but not entirely subjective. Chancellors in the English
courts of equity were guided not only by their views about morality and
"Divine Law" but also by the maxims of Roman law and the decisions of
Roman jurists." 8
The composition of the common law courts of England as just described was "received" by the American Judiciary at the founding of the
United States."' 9 To be sure, courts in the newly formed United States did
not and could not in most instances fully adopt the English legal system.
The process of transference was inevitably imperfect, and some elements
of the English system were simply lost in translation.120 Yet, perhaps just

remedy injustice by exercising a more discretionary jurisprudence."); Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging
Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role ofJudgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 949 (2010)
("It has long been taken for granted that in order to achieve justice in particular cases, the law must
provide consistency, and equity must allow judges the flexibility to do justice in the cases to which
the general rule does not seem to apply for one reason or another."); Marcus, supra note 2, at 474
("The development of equity as an escape valve from the rigidities of the common law underscores
the latter's formalism. The language of equity (the chancellor would act as the 'Court of Conscience,' with morality and common sense deciding claims), and the practice of equity (in Stephen
Subrin's words, 'flexible, discretionary, and individualized')-distinguished it from the formal
common law system." (quoting Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 (1987))).
117.
See, e.g., I SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 467 (A.L.
Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956) ("In early days there were no fixed principles upon
which the Chancellors exercised their equitable jurisdiction. The rule applied depended very much
upon the ideas as to right and wrong possessed by each Chancellor.").
118.
Despite initial reliance on morality and "Divine Law," the early Chancellors were guided
also by the maxims of Roman law and influenced by the decisions of Roman jurists. See, e.g.,
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 55, at 71 (Spencer W. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1941) ("There can be no doubt that [Chancellors] took their conception of equity from
the general description of it given by the Roman jurists, understoodand interpreted, however, according to their own theory of morality as a Divine law, and also borrowed many of the particular
rules by which this equity was applied from the Roman law."); see also Hon. H. Brent McKnight,
How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of Equity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 919, 923 (1994)
("There was a time when the chancellor, as the only judge in equity, had the power to override
ordinary law to achieve 'equity and good conscience' as determined by a more superior set of moral
principles than those governing the ordinary courts. Equity was closely identified with the prerogatives and personal conscience of the King. The chancellor's broad discretion was supposed to be
guided by natural law as expounded by Christian philosophers and divine law expressed in the Ten
Commandments and Roman Catholic moral doctrines.").
119. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137 (1996) (finding that virtually
all of the constitutions of the newly United States of America contained explicit provisions providing
for "reception" (or incorporation by reference) of the English common law, except to the extent
inconsistent with unique local circumstances); see also Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 805 (1951) ("[A] review of the
cases shows that no matter what the wording of the reception statute or constitutional provision of
the particular state, the rule developed, which was sooner or later to be repeated in practically every
American jurisdiction, that only those principles of the common law were received which were
applicable to the local situation."); Richard C. Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American Colonies, 30 AM. L. REG. 553, 554 (1882).
120. See, e.g., Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 41 N.E.2d 801, 802-03 (Ind. 1942) ("It is true that the
fundamental principles (of the law of equity) are the same as those which were developed through
the past centuries by the English chancery; but the application of these principles, and the particular
rules which have been deduced from them, have been shaped and determined by the modem American national life, and have received the impress of the American national character." (quoting I
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as inevitably, a juridical model that fit the English mold prevailed in the
courts of England's colonies in North America both before and after
those colonies formed the United States.12 1
Thus, although separate courts of equity as known in England were
not established in the United States, from the outset of the American
judicial system it was understood that a jurist could and would exercise
legal and equitable "jurisdiction" on two fictional "sides" of the court. 122
This notional structure permitted an American jurist, within the confines
of precedent, to simply don a different hat to afford a remedy in cases
thought to demand relief unavailable according to the strict system of
writs inherited from the English common law. 2 3
Underscoring the power to forego formalism by so transparent an
artifice as a fictional move to another "side" of the court (while remaining seated on the same bench), beginning in the mid-nineteenth century
any formal distinction between the jurisdiction of the courts of law and
equity in the United States was expressly abolished.12 4 This "merger"
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, As ADAPTED IN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA xiv (4th ed. 1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
121.
See, e.g., John T. Crossal, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 210 (1999)
("Th[e] basic model of separate courts traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to England's North American colonies. Although thirteen of these colonies threw off the yoke of English sovereignty, they did
not discard all English ways. When the framers of the Constitution began to design a system of
national courts, they naturally used the English model.... When they divided the federal courts
along the same lines as the English system, the framers undoubtedly envisioned that each of the
national courts would function in the same basic way as the English counterpart."); see also Thomas
0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 449-50 (2003)
("[Tihe early American courts were modeling the English method of complementary systems of law
and equity. Even prior to the American Revolution, 'courts of chancery had existed in some shape or
other in every one of the thirteen colonies.' Pursuant to Article Ill, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, the jurisdiction of the federal courts could extend to certain cases in Law and Equity.
Although Congress did not create a separate court of equity in the Judiciary Act of 1789, it contemplated that the federal court system would administer law and equity on different sides of the court
and by different procedures." (quoting Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American
Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (Comm. Ass'n Am. L.

Sch. ed. 1907))).
122.
See, e.g., Main, supra note 121, at 450 ("Congress did not create a separate court of equity
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, [however] it contemplated that the federal court system would administer law and equity on different 'sides' of the court and by different procedures."). But see City of
Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1949). Admonishing the lower courts, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
This is not a situation where a 'chancellor' . . . can be said to be enjoining a 'judge' who
has cognizance of a pending action at law. This is rather a case of a judge making a ruling
as to the manner in which he will try one issue in a civil action pending before himself.
The fiction ofa court with two sides . .. is not applicable where there is no other proceeding in existence. . .
Id. at 257-58.
123.
City of Morgantown, 337 U.S. at 256-58.
124.
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 476 (explaining that in 1848, the New York State
Legislature adopted David Dudley Field's code of civil procedure that abolished the formal distinction between the courts of law and equity); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of the Dispute:
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 78-79 (1989) ("After Roscoe Pound's famous 1906 address to the American Bar Association critical of late nineteenth century procedure, the Association took up the reform challenge with
renewed vigor and pressed for the merger of law and equity in the federal system and for a uniform
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cemented the notion that the same judge in the same case on the same
facts could afford relief not cognizable at law. Critics warned that this
merger in theory would empower jurists to simply disregard established
taxa to afford any relief thought to be just. 125 These critics' fears proved
ultimately to be without much merit, however. The merger of the courts
of law and equity did not break down American legal formalism beyond
the point of recognition in the courts of the United States, as the foregoing discussion of contemporary legal taxonomy demonstrates.
Still, the merger of the courts of law and equity was an augury that
portended a troubled future for the type of taxonomy epitomized by the
writ system. The merger of the courts of law and equity in the United
States during the fin de si~cle afforded an opportunity to forswear the
formalistic taxonomy typified by the English writ system. Unfortunately,
this merger proved to be a necessary but ultimately insufficient condition
for abjuring legal taxonomy as it is known today.
B. The Newly Adopted Codes of Civil Procedure
A second major development during the fin de si~cle signaled a
movement to do away with the then-dominant form of legal taxonomy.
Complementing the merger of the courts of law and equity, a movement
to reform the injustice of the old English writ system included a growing
understanding that civil procedure could and should be conceived and
regulated separately from the merits of a legal claim. In England and in
the United States, a distinction between "procedure" and "substance"
gained widespread acceptance during the fin de sidcle. The English legal
scholar Jeremy Bentham keenly described a distinction between civil
set of federal rules governing all civil actions. The ensuing struggle culminated in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective in 1938.").
125. This understanding of the merger was not without critics, especially insofar as it did not
dispel the long-standing presumption that a single jurist may exercise legal and equitable "jurisdiction" on two fictional "sides" of an American court. Even before the federal courts of the United
States were created, critics in England and in its North American colonies warned that a "merger" of
legal and equitable jurisdiction in the same judge would foster this dogma. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 128 n.4 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Federal Farmer [a commentator
writing at the time of the formation of the American judicial system] particularly feared the combination of equity and law in the same federal courts: 'It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same
judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is
only to step into his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we
have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain;
equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years will be mere discretion."'); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandingsof the "JudicialPower" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1043 n.267 (2001) ("The identity of the Federal
Farmer is contested."); see also W.S. Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 3 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1929) ("Should there be a judge who, enlightened by genius, stimulated by zeal to the
honest work of reformation, sick of the caprice, the delays, the prejudices, the ignorance, the malice,
the fickleness, the suspicious ingratitude of popular assemblies, should seek with his sole hand to
expunge the effusions of traditionary imbecility, and write down in their room the dictates of pure
and native justice, let him but reflect that partial amendment is bought at the expense of universal
certainty; that partial good thus purchased is universal evil; and that amendment from the Judgment
seat is confusion." (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 214 (Everett
ed. 1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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procedure and the substance of a legal claim in support of the reforms
that would ultimately replace the writ system:
Bentham . . . provided much of the ideological fuel for the procedural
reforms that were sweeping away the writ system in the latter years
of the century. The same analysis that supported the abolition of the
forms of action also portrayed as incoherent and indefensible the
Roman/civil categories of "personal actions" and "obligations," subdivided into parallel categories of contract and tort.
Bentham ... insisted that law should be analyzed on the basis of a
firm distinction between substantive law and procedure. This new
conceptual distinction helped Bentham and [others] make the case
that English law remained intellectually and practically incoherent
because substantive legal rights and duties were learned and classified for practice under the jumbled array of procedural forms that had
grown up over the centuries to enforce them. This had it backwards,
Bentham insisted; procedure should be designed functionally to serve
as the handmaiden of substance.1 26
In practical terms, Bentham's insights about the distinction between
the procedural aspects and the substantive merits of a claim for relief
found some parallel in newly propounded Codes of Procedure in America. In 1848, for example, the New York State Legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code of procedure.1 27 The "Field Code" was considered a
major advance. The Field Code was
premised on the idea that a single procedural form, the "civil action,"
could regulate the adjudication of all civil disputes, without altering
either the pre-existing legal rights and duties of the parties or the relief triggered by their violation.

. .

. Th[e] substantive law was the

substratum [that would be] left unchanged by the purely procedural
reforms, which affected only the machinations of lawyers and judges
inside the system. The reforms were only intended to make the machinery of justice run with less delay and expense.
The reformers ... believed that the simplified procedure would
create pressure for systematic reclassification of the law, which
would make it easier to teach and learn and more accessible to the

126. See Grey, supra note 2, at 1239-40.
127. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 476 ("The epoch of code pleading, the first major
domestic system of American procedure, began when the New York State Legislature adopted David
Dudley Field's code in 1848. Field listed the 'grotesque forms of action' and their primacy over
substantive justice, as well as the confusing and occasionally unjust separation between law and
equity, as motives for reform. The Field Code's 'crowning achievement' in [Charles] Clark's mind
was its replacement of the multifarious and confusing forms of action with a single form of action,
the 'civil action."' (quoting CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 18-19

(1940))); Grey, supra note 2, at 1231 ("Starting with New York's Field Code in 1848, legislatures
throughout the common-law world abolished the old writs and their offshoots in favor of the unitary
'civil action,' under which plaintiffs were simply to plead facts that established grounds for the relief
sought.").
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public. But a new arrangement of the law would not change its substance, except insofar as a better taxonomy exposed inconsistencies
and anomalies to the kind of scrutiny that might lead . . . to substan-

tive reform.128

By 1938, Charles Clark's newly minted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eschewed even the term "cause of action" with the hope to clearly
separate procedural questions from the substantive merits of a claim in
every possible way.129 The reformers of the fin de sicle anticipated that
the gap-filling tendencies of the 30common law would lead to a new and
better taxonomy of legal claims.1
This second major development set the stage for the abolition of legal taxonomy as it is known today. In newly enacted codes of procedure,
the reformers of the fin de si~cle set out to create the conditions that
would permit a more rational classification of legal claims to take hold. It
was the hope of the reformers that leaving this classification to the vagaries of legal scholarship and practice would inspire a "better taxonomy"
that would "expose[] inconsistencies and anomalies to the kind of scrutiny that might lead ... to substantive reform."' 3 Lamentably, these hopes
were misguided and the faith of the fin de sidcle reformers was misplaced.
C. "PrimaryRights" Theory anda Fateful Consensus to Abjure It
Certain scholars during the fin de si~cle, notably John Norton
Pomeroy, capitalized on some of the same assumptions that propelled the
merger of law and equity, and reform of the rules of civil procedure, to
conceive a better means to ascertain and classify legally cognizable
claims. Pomeroy saw the opening that the substance-procedure fissure
created, and worked into that fissure his vision of substantive legal
claims based on "primary rights."l 3 2 An iteration of Pomeroy's theory of
primary rights was described in Crowley v. Katleman'33 as follows:
[P]rimary right theory ... provides that a cause of action is com-

prised of a primary right of the plaintiff .... The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a
single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action. ...

128.
See Grey, supranote 2, at 1240-41.
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 439-40. Charles Clark was "the primary and most
129.
important author of the Federal Rules" adopted in 1938. Id. at 496 ("Clark recommended that the
term cause of action, 'worst of all in its capacity for mischief,' appear nowhere in the Federal
Rules." (quoting Memorandum from Charles Clark to the Advisory Committee (Jan. 23, 1936) (on
file with Yale University Library))).
See supranote 126.
130.
Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
131.
See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 481-82 (describing the approach advocated by John
132.
Norton Pomeroy).
881 P.2d 1083 (1994).
133.
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As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the
plaintiffs right to be free from the particular injury suffered.... It
must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury is premised: "Even where there are multiple legal
theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives
rise to only one claim for relief." The primary right must also be distinguished from the remedy sought: "The violation of one primary
right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of action, one not being determinative of the
other."1 34
Thus, just as the courts of law and equity were merging in the late
nineteenth century, a true synthesis of the best attributes of those systems
was persuasively propounded. In truly unified courts, infringement of a
legally cognizable primary right would give rise to a palette of possible
remedies: secondary, plenary, and tailored to "naturally fit" the violation."
Pomeroy's theory of primary rights did not depend upon scholarly
musings or judicial whim and caprice. Instead, Pomeroy's primary rights
theory built upon the firm foundation of precedent established over time
within the strictures of the courts of law and equity as inherited from
England and developed in America. Identification of primary rights was
as elegant as it was expansive; a logical culmination of the reform of the
writ system of magnificent proportions. As Professor Robert G. Bone
explains:
Pomeroy believed that it was possible to reduce law ... to a system
of internally consistent and complete general principles. The general
principles were not directly knowable through reason.... [T]hose
principles emerged gradually through a process of judicial deliberation that combined reliance on precedent with the application of the
"natural justice" ideal to the facts of particular cases. Natural justice
was the fountainhead of legal principle, for it served as a bridge between law and the society's moral sense. In the early stages of equity,
judges had applied the natural justice norm to decide individual cases, thereby building a body of precedent from which principles could
be extracted. Those judges had gradually perfected those principles
134.
Id. at 1090 (quoting Slater v. Blackwood, 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 (1975); Wulfjen v. Dolton,
24 Cal.2d 891, 895-96 (1944)).
135.
See, e.g., Christopher Columbus Langdell, A BriefSurvey ofEquity Jurisdiction, I HARV.
L. REv. Ill, 111 (1887) ("It is because rights exist and because they are sometimes violated that
remedies are necessary. The object of all remedies is the protection of rights. . . . An action may
protect a right in three ways, namely, by preventing the violation of it, by compelling a specific
reparation of it when it has been violated, and by compelling a compensation in money for a violation of it."); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 13 ("The ideal remedy was the one that best fit the
right in the sense of most perfectly restoring the right to its preinfringement state. A person was
entitled to a legal remedy only if she suffered an infringement of a legal right, and conversely,
whenever a legal right was infringed the rightholder was entitled to a legal remedy adequate to
restore the right.").
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by testing that precedent against the developing natural justice ideal
in particular cases.136
This well-reasoned construct prefers the grand process of the common law to its grand theorists. Pomeroy's view of primary rights was
based on extant and discernible legal principles. Conceptually, Pomeroy's theories fit perfectly both with his times and the zeitgeist of the
American enterprise. Not surprisingly, Pomeroy's primary rights "were
roughly the standard natural rights of liberal theory: personal security,
subdivided into rights to life, body and limb, and reputation; the right to
personal liberty; the right to acquire and enjoy private property; and finally, the right of religious belief and worship."1 37 These values were
embodied in the foundational documents of the United States.13 8 Indeed,
it is entirely possible to view certain rights that today are considered
"constitutional" as simply codified variants of independently established
primary rights.139 Apart from and in addition to constitutional bases,
these values have stood the test of time despite well-founded concerns
about proliferation. 140 Subject to these and other concerns, a legal system
based on the recognition of primary rights promotes respect for the law
and a common-sense approach to justice.141
136.
Bone, supra note 124, at 41-42.
137.
Grey, supra note 2, at 1254.
138.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights . . . ."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). Indeed,
the government of the United States was founded in no small measure on the rights-based approach
typified by the work of John Locke. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
INSTITUTE
OF
PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS,
CENTER
FOR
ETHICAL
DELIBERATION,

http://mcb.unco.edu/ced/perspectives/rights.cfn (last visited Nov. 10, 2012) ("Since his thought has
had such an influence on American political life, a study of the ethics of John Locke (and rightsbased perspectives in general) is needed. . . . [T]he US is based on a system of individual
rights. .. .").
139. See, e.g., Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Rights Done Right: A Critique of LibertarianOriginalism, 78 UMKC L. REV. 661, 696 (2010) ("I contend, then, that the Ninth Amendment, in particular,
requires judges to apply a presumption in favor of the protection of natural rights as they.are embodied in common law rights, meaning natural rights limited legitimately under the natural law principles incorporated in the traditional common law.... I agree ... that, under the principles of our
constitutional regime, the common law serves as the background or presumptive source of legal
rules and thus is the foundation of the people's rights and responsibilities.").
140.
There are some who decry a potentially problematic explosion of discourse about "rights."
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919 21 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (postulating a nonhuman right of free speech); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of
Rights, 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 978 (1986) ("[T]he persuasiveness of rights discourse is to a significant extent semantic. That is to say, the language of rights tends to persuade not by illuminating the
matters at issue, but by concealing them through linguistic sleight of hand. The rhetoric of rights
derives its force from a deep-seated ambiguity in the ordinary meaning of the word 'rights'-an
ambiguity that causes disputing parties to assume away the very issues they purport to be addressing.... [W]e find ourselves facing a proliferation of 'rights'-such as ... animal rights-rather than
a proliferation of 'liberties,' 'freedoms,' or 'entitlements."'); STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/legal-rights/#l (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (surveying
various approaches to determining legal rights).
141.
See, e.g., Alan Calnan, The InstrumentalJustice of PrivateLaw, 78 UMKC L. REV. 559,
591-92 (2010) ("Rights work better than rules for two reasons. First, rights are what people want out
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Unfortunately, Pomeroy's primary rights theory gained less than
enduring and widespread acceptance, with long-lasting consequences.142
The "reformers" of the legal system in the United States, beginning in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, with varying intensity rejected a rights-based approach. 14 3 Ironically, leading scholars of
the day who figured prominently in the "reform" movement during the
fin de si-cle hastened (unwittingly it seems) the advance of unworkable
theoretical distinctions between tort and contract law that have morphed
into the incoherent taxa we know today.
For example, Charles Clark, the principal author of the highly influential Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a leader of the reform
movement during the fin de silcle,'" was unhesitatingly critical of a legal system based on the vindication of infringements upon primary

of private law. As a general rule, people will obey specific laws only if they believe the larger legal
system is just; and they will consider the system just only if it protects individual rights. . . . Second,
and concomitantly, rights work better because they come equipped with informal policing mechanisms. It is difficult enough to get people to do things they do not want or are not inclined to do. It is
more difficult still if, as is true of rules, the state is the only overseer. The state simply cannot be
everywhere it needs to be, and its authority as 'outside' rule enforcer only goes so far. Thus, it must
rely on people to control other people. This is what rights do best. By inspiring a belief in and a
commitment to the law, rights get ordinary citizens to enforce the rules from the inside out.").
142.
See Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law's Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 633-34
(2008) ("We know now, of course, that Pomeroy's classification lost the intellectual debate over a
century ago. Today's legal canon, reflected in the mandatory first-year courses and in the shape and
division of legal scholarship generally, is organized primarily around differences in forms of law
rather than upon legal protections for primary substantive interests. The adoption of a classification
scheme hinging on legal form, rather than some version of a primary rights approach, carried with it
dramatic implications for the development of American legal scholarship. These implications vary in
severity for different fields of law, as certain disciplines would have thrived under either approach.... For other fields, however, the choice of a typology based on legal form rather than primary rights had dramatic ramifications, which still resonate more than a century later.").
143.
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 124, at 79 82 ("Early twentieth century reformers ... rejected
the late nineteenth century natural-rights-based theory . . .. The reformers adopted a pragmatic view
instead. They envisioned substantive law in terms of an ideal fit with the facts of social life, not with
the abstract structure of rights, and they relied on professional expertise and community experience
to achieve the law-society fit.... In 1913, [Wesley Newcomb] Hohfeld published his seminal article
challenging the late nineteenth century conception of 'legal right,' an article that triggered a major
jurisprudential debate about the idea of right and the proper classification of legal relations. While
participants disagreed about the implications of Hohfeld's analysis, most agreed with Hohfeld's
central propositions-that there was no universally ideal system of legal rights; that legal rights were
the result of socially contingent policy choices, and that legal relations could not all be derived from
or reduced to the concept of 'right."'); see also Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 978 (1982) ("Hohfeld's
article [was] a landmark in the history of legal thought.").
144.
See Bone, supra note 124, at 80 ("Charles Clark and Roscoe Pound [are noteworthy]
because of their prominence in the reform movement. Clark and Pound shaped the movement's
public rhetoric and its constructive agenda. Both men were avid publicists for reform; both wrote a
great deal on the subject, and both participated actively in concrete reform efforts. Furthermore, the
legal community saw Clark and Pound as the intellectual leaders of procedural reform, and other
reform advocates frequently referred to their work to support criticism of existing practice and
proposals for change. Clark's and Pound's jurisprudential views thus provide a window onto the
beliefs that shaped the reform program.").
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rights. He rejected the taxonomy that primary rights theory supposedly
required, on primarily practical grounds. 14 5
Ironically, however, by rejecting a more fulsome classification of
legal claims based on primary rights established in the common law,
Clark encouraged a form of taxonomy far worse. Clark's fears about
fostering useless taxonomic debates owing to use of the term "cause of
action" have been manifested a thousand-fold, albeit perhaps not in the
way he envisioned. The threat has come not from a system proposed
during the fin de si~cle based on discernible and enforceable primary
rights but from attempts by courts and scholars to describe the substantive law of actions after the writ system fell by reference to the same old
regime that gave rise to the writ system in the first place.
Contrary to the belief of "reformers [like Clark] that ... simplified
procedure would create pressure for [a] systematic reclassification of the
law [that] would make it easier to teach and learn and more accessible to
the public,"1 46 legal scholars during the fin de si~cle sought and found
comfort in the old scholarship with which they were already familiar.
Roman law distinguished obligations arising out of promise or agreement
(ex contractu) from obligations arising out of wrongs (ex delicto).1 47
When confronted with the challenge the reformers laid down, instead of
preferring Pomeroy's vision of a reformed system founded on primary
rights discernible in the common law, legal theorists in particular reverted to views that had been prevalent since Roman times:
Sophisticated English and American legal writers had long promoted the study of Roman and civil law on the ground that it sup145. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 439-40. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure architect
Charles Clark's critique of primary rights theory can be described as follows:
Clark recommended that the term cause of action, "worst of all in its capacity for mischief," appear nowhere in the Federal Rules. By 1938, he had soured on the term entirely,
after struggling with his own stab at defining it.... [He claimed the very idea ofa "cause
of action"] had misled generations of lawyers to waste time in conceptual disputes over
primary rights and the like at the expense of efficient trial work-an end procedural rules
could actually serve.
Id at 496.
Clark's approach to the cause of action neatly illustrates realism in pleading. His deconstruction of the primary rights approach is a textbook illustration of a realist attack on
conceptualistic doctrine. [Clark contended that] the concept of a primary right 'seem[ed]
to be precise, and yet upon application in practice [failed to] carry any exact meaning . . . .' To say that a plaintiff had a primary right simply begged the question of what
the primary right consisted of and, more importantly, why.
Id. at 488 (alteration in original) (quoting Charles E. Clark, The Cause ofAction, 82 U. PA. L. REV.
354, 386 (1934)); see also Bellia, supra note 109, at 796 ("Charles Clark believed that Pomeroy's
'primary right' theory was vague and unworkable.").
146.
Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
147.
Id. at 1234. Notably, the legal tradition expressed by the highly influential legal scholar
Sir William Blackstone (July 10, 1723-February 14, 1780) might have served as a potential beacon
to guide a different course because certain of Blackstone's views were more consistent with Pomeroy's vision than with Roman law: "Blackstone's formulation of the modem 'absolute rights of
individuals,' the natural rights to life, liberty, property, and personal security . .. had no parallel in
Roman law." Id. at 1248.

252

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

plied a more logical and elegant arrangement than the common-law
writ system. So when in the mid-nineteenth century the abolition of
the forms of action required a new arrangement based on substantive
law categories, it was natural to look to the civil law-where an impressive body of literature defined and elaborated the distinctions between property and obligations and then between contract and tort.
During the final period of transition from the writ system to the
new simplified civil procedure, from about 1850 on, English and
American legal writers came to agree that contracts would be one
fundamental branch of the new substantive private law, and their
treatment of the subject was much influenced by civilian scholarship.
Since the civilian tradition paired tort with contract as the two fundamental subdivisions of the law of obligations, recognition of contract as one basic category naturally suggested that tort should be another. 148
An epic and infamous flip-flop by a prominent legal theorist exemplifies the lost opportunity to strangle in its infancy the reinstitution of
this archaic but now-familiar taxonomy of civil law claims. As Professor
Thomas Grey notes, a scholar as notable as Oliver Wendell Holmes

wrote as late as 1871 that "[t]orts is not a proper subject for a law
book" 49 because "[v]iewed from the perspective of the classification of
primary rights or duties, the category of tort [is] . . . entirely incoher-

ent.""o Yet, only two years later Holmes capitulated and wrote an essay
titled "The Theory of Torts" in which "he formulated a structural account
of tort law very close to the one we use today."' 5 ' When the time came to
fulfill the hopes of the reformers, and to help others to see the way forward more clearly, Holmes (and others) blinked. Just as the time was at
hand to finally envision a better means to more coherently classify legally cognizable claims, the great Holmes and his contemporaries succumbed to the ancien regime.152
The observations of Roscoe Pound, another prominent beacon of
the fin de si~cle, cast more light on the lamentable reasons underlying the
failure to jettison the most untoward aspects of a nascent form of the
fundamentally flawed legal taxonomy known today-just when it
seemed the stars were so perfectly aligned to do so. Pound saw the merits
Id. at 1235-36.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5 AM. L. REv. 340, 341 (1871) (reviewing C.G.
ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS (1870)).
150.
Grey, supra note 2, at 1244.
151.
Id. at 1232; see also id. at 1252 ("Holmes . . . conclude[d] that, whatever the abstract
merits of the analytical critique of tort, any practical taxonomy of Anglo-American substantive law
had to incltide it as a primary category.").
152.
Grey, supra note 2, at 1282 ("In the law, theories, however brilliant, do not thrive unless
they also serve significant interests. John Norton Pomeroy had ideas about the organization of the
law that, simply regarded as ideas, may have been as good as Holmes'-yet no one remembers
them. Holmes' theory of torts turned out to have practical strengths that he never claimed for it, and
that he may never have realized it possessed.").
148.
149.
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of primary rights theory, but he found it to be merely the fourth of five
stages in the evolution of legal thought.153 The fifth stage, Pound reasoned, was attainable and at hand in the early twentieth century.
In this fifth stage of legal development, at least in the essential respects that Pound described, Pound believed that legally enforceable
rights would be fashioned from "interests" that arise out of a socially
connected society. 154 Perhaps some threads of the "sociological" law that
Pound projected can be teased out of contemporary decisions. 55 But
today there are also signs of a distinct strain of scholarly advocacy that
harkens back to the second rung on Pound's ladder of legal development.' 56
Regrettably, if there is a force of progress that impels the development of better functioning legal systems, there is no rule that such progress is linear. Even though there is ample historical support for the conclusion that the elimination of outdated doctrinal classifications is preferable to a system of ever-increasing hair-splitting with respect to the
forms of action, today instead there are signs of a distinct strain of scholarly advocacy in which echoes can be heard of the justifications for the
rigid writs that gave rise to the courts of equity in the first place. Some
contemporary legal scholars apply their talents still in the futile effort to
properly discern the "taxonomy" of particular claims, laden by the burdens imposed by the current system of doctrinal classification.1 7
153.
See Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARv. L. REv. 195, 220 (1914); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 90-91 ("[According to Pound,]
the fourth stage [of legal development is] 'the maturity of law.' . . . American law entered this fourth
stage during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and its most important contribution was the
idea of right .... Late nineteenth century jurists . . . celebrated Pound's fourth stage as the fulfillment of law's teleological end, as the perfection of a rational legal system embodying general principles structured around an ideal system of primary rights.").
154. See Bone, supra note 124, at 91-92 ("Pound believed that mature law was deeply
flawed.... Pound thought that the law of his time was entering a fifth stage, the 'socialization of
law,' spurred on by recognition of the interconnected and interdependent web of social [lives]....
'Interest' for Pound had nothing to do with relationships among or arrangements of legal rights. The
idea of 'interest' was logically and normatively prior to legal right. Interests were a matter of social
fact, and legal righLs were created in order to promote social interests.").
155.
In one sense, decisions like Citizens United may evoke Pound's fifth stage of legal development. As Justice Stevens explained, "The Framers ... took it as a given that corporations could be
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare. Unlike our colleagues [in the majority], they had little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings . . . ." Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-50 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). But the majority's decision in Citizens United instead characterized a corporation's right of
free speech in a manner that may serve as an iteration of the thesis that "[i]nterests [are] a matter of
social fact, and legal rights [are] created in order to promote [those] social interests." Bone, supra
note 124, at 92.
156. In the second of five stages of legal development postulated by Pound, scholars and courts
struggle to fit claims within defined classifications. Bone, supra note 124, at 90 ("In the second
stage, that of 'strict law,' . . . the desired level of certainty and security could only be achieved by the
formal application of rigid rules. The common law writ system was the quintessential example of
this rigidity.").
157. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 2, at 5 ("They [certain of my colleagues] think the law of
negligent misrepresentation ... is best understood as part of negligence law. [I don't.] Taxonomy
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The work of contemporary legal taxonomists thus not only impedes
the path to progress in the development of the legal system in the United
States but also harkens back to an earlier era that was demonstrably in
need of fundamental reforms. Among the imperfect alternatives, the legal
taxonomy of today is the more regressive and perhaps the least attractive
choice. A contemporary legal taxonomist must "learn to live with" the
"fuzzy" and "sloppy" boundaries he purports to describe.' 58 To be sure,
this may be a slight demand in some respects, as the taxonomist may
suffer only intellectual discomfiture as a result of the inability to draw
reliable doctrinal distinctions. But the contemporary legal taxonomist
must also indulge the near certainty that the result of indistinct designs
will be distinct harm unrecompensed in the real world. For someone,
some legal remedies will be made unavailable owing to the vaguely
drawn doctrinal classifications with which the contemporary legal taxonomist has "learned to live."' 59 Any such legal regime is in design and
effect defective.
matters." (emphasis added)). Adherence to "core" legal taxa resembles in some respects what some
have called "[c]lassical legal science" based on "antebellum understandings of the natural sciences."
Marcus, supra note 2, at 444.
From judicial opinions, the raw data or fossil record of the law, a legal scholar would inductively uncover general principles, then classify them in a taxonomy akin to the ordering of species. The resulting classificatory schemes had practical utility. After fitting a
case into the right category, the judge would derive appropriate rules from the fundamental principles using a rigidly deductive logical method; these rules would become the major premise, and the case's facts the minor premise, in a syllogism that would generate results.
Classical legal science was conceptualistic. It rested on the premise that fundamental
principles or concepts of law existed independently of any particular case in an autonomous legal order.
Id. at 444-45.
158. Gergen, supra note 2, at 38 ("A workable taxonomy of law requires either we live with
some sloppiness in the theory we use to define a field or we live with some sloppiness in the specification of the periphery of the field. We can have a tight theory to define a field and a fuzzily defined
periphery or we can have a fuzzy theory to define a field. The success of classical theories of contract and the modem theory of negligence suggest tight theories are going to win out over fuzzy
theories in defining the core of a field in any event. This is to be expected. Most teaching and theorizing about a field focuses on the core. A tight theory will always beat out a fuzzy theory in explaining the core. If I am right about this, then we need to learn to live with some sloppiness in specifying
the periphery.").
159. To his credit, in a recent article that addresses the proper taxonomy of a claim for negligent misrepresentation, Professor Gergen recognizes (in another context) that the practical consequences of a strict taxonomy of claims based on economic loss might be "unjust":
Liability is not imposed for nakedly-some would say offensively-prudential and policy reasons despite the dictates of ordinary morality. In particular, a claim is denied even
though the result seems unjust in a specific case because of the need for a bright-line rule
and concerns for the cost and risk of error in processing similar claims in future cases.
Gergen, supranote 2, at 49 (citing the "stranger" economic loss rule). Elsewhere, and in yet another
context, Professor Gergen allows that in certain cases "a situation-specific cause of action or liability
rule [is necessary] to protect especially vulnerable claimants from what is in retrospect clearly unreasonable conduct." Id. at 6. The latter formulation may ameliorate the former, but it is not sufficient,
as it depends too much on ad hoc determinations by courts and attomeys, about the majority of
whom Professor Gergen opines: "We may realistically expect nonspecialistjudges and lawyers to be
familiar with the core principles of a few major fields of the law. More than this is unrealistic." Id. at
38 (emphasis added). Further, given that disagreement by Professor Gergen's colleagues about the
proper taxonomy of certain long-seasoned tort claims (typified by claims for negligent misrepresen-
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Although the battle to abjure legal taxonomy as we now know it
was lost during the fin de sidcle, over time the sort of legal taxonomy in
vogue today surely will lose the war for survival in right-thinking common law courts. Studied indifference to the maxim ubijus, ibi remedium
will not prevail in the long term if the essential common law character of
the American juridical system survives.1 60 For in the development of the
law in the United States, the clamor for a rights-based approach has begun again.
IV. LEAVING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY

Echoes of primary legal rights theory are heard in certain interstices
of current legal practice. For example, California relies on a variant of
this theory to determine the issue of res judicata in a civil law suit.'61 The
thinking of some early twentieth-century scholars about interests and
enforceable primary rights was also evidenced in the organization of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, at least insofar as the categories of torts
were grouped with reference to invasions of interests of "[a] person [in
self], [in] land, or [in] chattels."'1 62 These echoes are hardly more than
whispers in the grand scheme of American jurisprudence, however. Contation) compelled his resignation as an ALl reporter, hope for anything more than the permanent
confusion inherent in contemporary legal taxonomy would not well-founded. After all, were it not
so, it would be hard to imagine so great a loss to the ALl of so fine a reporter over so basic a question about contemporary legal taxonomy. That this regrettable loss occurred (and was perceived to
be necessary) speaks volumes about the disadvantages of contemporary legal taxonomy.
160.
Although real harm is done by reason of attempts to adopt the theoretical classification of
claims propounded by legal theorists of the contemporary legal taxonomist stripe, there is some
reason to admire their works of pure abstraction. As was once said of criticism leveled at Joseph
Beale's work and theories:
[Beale's] approach would ultimately be judged not for its theoretical niceties but for its
real-world results.... Metaphysical observations about the nature of law do not resolve
concrete problems, and ... theoretical purity [is] purchased at the price of ignoring practical issues. This preference for theory over praxis [is] an easy target for criticism[,] ...
as an arbitrary metaphysics, based on "jejune notions of an omnipresence."... But it is
more a vessel of reflection, and less a bark of dogma, than such appraisals indicate. The
internal structure is really rather elegant, its concepts interacting with a smoothness and
complexity suspiciously reminiscent of celestial spheres, phlogiston, luminiferous ether,
and other refined illusions.
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448,
2457-58 (1999) (quoting Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and InternationalLaw, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1096 (1956)).
161.
See, e.g., Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (1994) ("The primary right theory
has a fairly narrow field of application. It is invoked most often when a plaintiff attempts to divide a
primary right and enforce it in two suits."). For a critique of the California system, see Walter W.
Heiser, California's Confusing CollateralEstoppel (Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 509, 521-22 (1998) ("[T]he California Supreme Court has continued to employ the primary
rights theory as the basis of California's res judicata doctrine. In current res judicata determinations,
the court typically defines the scope of a primary right by reference to the 'harm suffered,' by the
litigant, as opposed to the particular theory of recovery asserted or remedy sought. . . . By focusing
on the 'harm suffered' by the plaintiff, the primary rights theory provides an ambiguous and unpredictable test for determining whether a defendant's conduct creates one or more causes of action.
This abstract approach to claim preclusion requires further judicial interpretation of what categories
of harms are 'primary' harms. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court has not developed clear
guidelines for the classification of harms for the purpose of primary rights distinctions.").
162.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 519

(1977).
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temporary legal taxonomy, by and large, remains based on the now familiar classifications that replaced the old writs. 163
Despite this state of affairs and the marginalization of Pomeroy's
primary rights theory during the fin de siacle, a variant of rights-based
analysis has emerged in contemporary scholarship. Professor Randy
Barnett observed three decades ago a renewed interest in a form of
"normative legal philosophy" that might displace legal realism and positivism.'64 Different in the main from Pomeroy's vision, a normative legal
philosopher nevertheless similarly asks not what the "law is" but rather
what the "law ought to be." Normative legal philosophers, as just described, joined a "new coalition [that] agree[d] that . . . refining legal
doctrine through traditional forms of legal analysis grounded on the identification of moral principles is a defensible and worthwhile activity."l 65
Professor Richard S. Markovits's work reflects views of this sort.
Professor Markovits focuses on moral rights in a schema of idealized
integrity that he denominates a "rights-based society."166 He recognizes
the instantiation of "moral" rights in part in the common law of torts, but
he also finds that this method is not a sufficiently reliable means to ascertain rights rooted in moral precepts.1 6 7 Professor Markovits would instead
163.
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
953 (2010) ("[O]ur legal tradition[] [treats] Torts as among a handful of fundamental legal categories
such as Contracts, Property, and Criminal Law.").
164.
See Randy E. Barnett, ContractScholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1223, 1224, 1233 (1984) (tracing the recent development of "normative legal
philosophy which . . . has been displacing the schools of legal positivism and realism that once
dominated legal thinking" and undermining the "amoralism and pragmatism of both the efficiency
approach of law and economics and the views of the legal realists."). Legal positivism eschews
normative and moralistic considerations in favor of a more "empirical" approach. See, e.g., David
Lyons, Founders and Foundations of Legal Positivism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 722, 722 (1984) ("The
tradition of legal theorizing that we call 'positivism' embraces two principal, related ideas: first, law
is a species of empirical fact; second, law must be distinguished from morality-in particular, we
must not confuse the law that we actually have with the law as we would like it to be.").
165.
Id. at 1224-25. Professor Barnett goes so far as to say that "[a]lthough legal positivism
still exerts a powerful hold over many legal academics and students, the growing strength of the new
normative philosophy may indicate that the positivist separation of law from morals is currently on
the wane." Id. at 1227.
166.
Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-JusticeSecuring Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, U. ILL. L. REV. 243, 245 (2006) ("(1)
[R]ights-based societies are morally and constitutionally obligated both (A) to protect the primary
moral rights of their members and participants and (B) to give them an appropriate opportunity to
secure redress from wrongdoers who have violated their primary rights-i.e., to secure their secondary, corrective-justice rights-and (2) various actual countries-e.g., the United States (and such
other countries as Germany)-are liberal, rights-based societies of moral integrity.").
167.
Id. at 256 ("[A] type of tort-law study that has a normative component tries to infer the
normative underpinnings of the primary tort rights of a society's members and participants that are
legally enforceable from some mixture of the arguments judges have made in their tort-case opinions
and the conclusions they have reached in such cases. Although such analyses can make a valuable
contribution, I believe that their value is reduced by three 'facts': (1) the fact that the moral rights
and obligations of the members of any society should be inferred from the society's members' moral-rights discourse, conclusions, perceptions, and conduct outside as well as inside legal fora; (2) the
'fact' that, since Lochner, American judges have hesitated to articulate much less discuss the moral
foundations of their decisions even when their decisions were based on moral argument; and (3) the

2012]

LEA VING CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY

257

permit and perhaps compel judges to expressly base their decisions on
rights recognized as a matter of moral integrity.' 68 (In this, one hears the
echoes of an eleventh-century Chancellor's views.) Professor Markovits
looks as well to extra-judicial fora to ascertain "moral" rights, although
the means by which he proposes the content of moral rights may be so
derived remain, in some respects, oblique.16 9
It can be cogently contended that even a well-conceived and rich
conception of tort law is an imperfect means to instantiate moral principles and effect corrective justice. And one cannot reasonably disagree
that "taking justice seriously may require going beyond doctrinal analysis. When a doctrine runs into trouble or when conflicts between doctrines arise, [one] may need to look to more fundamental notions of justice."l 70 Yet, the advocates of contemporary legal taxonomy can be expected to oppose the duplication of moral values in a system of legal
classification nearly devoid in any formal sense of such considerations.
For instance, as Professors Goldberg and Zipursky rightly note, one
who trespasses believing land to be one's own has engaged in no moral
wrong but is nevertheless liable in tort. One who exercises one's best
judgment but is honestly mistaken about the objectively unreasonable
nature of a risk is at "fault" in tort, despite the fact that few would say
that actor has behaved "immorally."1 7 1 Goldberg and Zipursky correctly
observe (to an end different from mine) that imposing the condition of
moral wrong upon tort law as it is presently conceived therefore has been
resisted:
For sound doctrinal reasons, tort theorists have been disinclined to
cast torts as moral wrongs. For a different set of jurisprudential reasons, they have instead treated torts as legal wrongs. Yet in doing so,
they have felt compelled to concede that this choice necessarily

'fact' that the concrete moral rights of a rights-based society's members and participants are legal
rights, regardless of whether such legal rights have been recognized in courts of law.").
168.
Id. at 250 ("[C]ommon-law courts can make the tort-related moral rights of their society's
members and participants legally enforceable without promulgating new legislation-indeed, are
obligated to do so (i.e., to enable their society's members and participants to secure corrective justice).").
169.
Id. Professor Markovits would allow "government officials" to "promulgate goal-oriented
tort legislation if, but only if, 'the People' have explicitly authorized them to do so and the legislation in question does not on balance disserve the rights-related interests of the relevant society's
members and participants." Id. Professor Markovits would forbid delegation by the legislature of this
power to the courts: "[U]nless the People have explicitly authorized the legislature to redelegate their
tort-law-making power to judges or administrative-agency officials, the legislature may not authorize
such officials to promulgate new legislation-inter alia, may not authorize courts to create new law
(as opposed to announcing preexisting law that had not previously been articulated)." Id
170.
See Barnett, supra note 164, at 1236.
171.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 951 (citing Vaughan v. Menlove (1837) 3 BING.
N.C. 467, 132 E.R. 490 (C.P.)) (noting that individual judgment and good faith are generally irrelevant to the applicable negligence standard).
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drains the normative aspect of the idea of a wrong from torts, leaving
only an empty conceptual shell.172
Instead of concluding that the doctrinal category known as "torts"
therefore should be abjured, however, Goldberg and Zipursky embrace
the doctrinal classification by recasting torts as private wrongs according
to a "civil-recourse theory" of tort liability.17 1 They state:
What stands next to Contracts, Property, and Criminal Law is
the law of private wrongs. By recognizing torts as wrongs, civilrecourse theory permits legal scholars to make sense of and develop
further a vast body of concepts and principles central to a general understanding of American law.174
Goldberg and Zipursky argue that the classification of claims based
on conduct that is "wrong," in the sense they understand the word, makes
sense of the tort taxa.175 The taxonomic division of obligations to which
the old ex contractuand ex delicto distinction belongs thus emerges as an
extremely durable version of the old Roman model that can and will resist the influence of contemporary appeals for the primacy of moral principles in the pursuit of coherence in the application of tort law. Moral
values may cohere with tort law in some instances, but it may be simply
too difficult to recast a "tort"-based doctrinal classification as a pure replication of moral obligations.176 A rights-based approach based on moral
precepts thus fails to shake the contemporary legal taxonomists' hold on
a fundamental classification of legal claims based on "tortious" conduct.
If it is difficult to cast the law of torts solely in terms of moral valties, it is nearly impossible to find "enforceable moral rights" to be at the
root of cognizable claims for breach of contract, at least insofar as that
172.
Id. at 930. The authors describe the "Moral-Legal Dilemma" associated with characterizing torts as "wrongs" as follows: "[The dilemma is that] one cannot characterize torts as moral
wrongs without losing the ability to account for large swaths of doctrine, yet one cannot characterize
torts as legal wrongs without rendering the concept of 'wrong' vacuous (a legal wrong being anything the law defines as a legal wrong)." Id. at 947-48.
173.
Id at 953, 985-86 (describing a "wrongs-and-recourse" model of tort law).
174. Id. at 985-86.
175.
Id at 950-51 ("[T]here is no obstacle to seeing tort law as a domain of duty-imposing
legal directives. And then it is straightforward to understand torts-the violations of these directives-as legal wrongs.").
176. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1585-86 (2006)
("[H.L.A.] Hart analyzed obligations as a genus of social and normative forms (for lack of a better
term), and he took moral obligations and legal obligations each to be different species of that genus. . .. [O]ur own aim, within tort, has been to avail ourselves of a roughly Hartian framework for
thinking about the nature of duties in tort law. ... [Although] legal obligations are, in many respects,
the same sort of creature as moral obligations ... because law comes with consequences that morality does not (most obviously state-enforced sanctions), and because there are, at times, demands on
law that it take a certain form that renders it efficacious, capable of being internalized, and amenable
to application by judges, there will be times at which it is appropriate for legislatures and judges and
jurors to decline to elevate certain moral norms to legal norms. Similarly, there are sometimes reasons that favor recognition of legal norms that do not have counterparts in morality.")
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taxa has been traditionally and is presently understood.17 7 Very recently,
however, bold legal philosophers like Professor Andrew Gold have argued that because "private law-the law of torts, contracts, and property-is at an interpretive impasse . . . [there should be] a new way to understand private law . . . as a means for individuals to exercise their moral enforcement rights."178 For Professor Gold, even a breach of contract
may create in the promissee a "moral enforcement right," to wit:
According to [some] account[s], contract law diverges from morality
in light of the contractual overlap with promising.

...

A contract is

often portrayed as a promissory relationship. And contract law doctrines, at least purportedly, are premised on the idea that people
should feel free to breach their agreements as long as they pay damages. Promissory morality, in contrast, frowns upon a breach of
promise even if damages are paid, and even if the breach is efficient.
Consequently, contract law appears to disregard the moral duty that a
promisor owes to a promisee....
[I] offer[] ... a different way to understand contract law....
[C]ontract law, like other fields within private law, is best understood
in terms of moral enforcement rights. Contract law is not about the
contractual promisor's moral duties to the promisee, and so we
should not be looking for contract law doctrines to parallel a promisor's moral duties. Once we consider moral enforcement rights, the
meaning of contractual remedies changes.

. .

. [I]f we focus on a

promisee's moral enforcement rights, contract law may actually rep-

resent a convergence between legal doctrine and moral principles.179
Here again, a legal philosopher may focus on the rights of the individual based on moral values; in Professor Gold's view of contract law,
the promissee's. But again, this proposed conceptual model will run
straight into the contemporary legal taxonomists' hold on the view that
177.
See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462
(1897) ("Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of
contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary rights and duties are invested with a
mystic significance beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else.
If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are
liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can."). In any event, Holmes resisted the recognition
of primary rights theory in the common law. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2189 (2009) ("Holmes'
view[s] may have been the product of his jurisprudential attempts to dispense with the concept of
'primary rights."').
178.
Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873,
1910 (2011) ("Instead of thinking that a wronged party possesses a right to 'act against another'
when there has been a violation of her legal rights, we may recognize that the right of redress applies
in cases where the wronged party has suffered a violation of a strong moral right. In those cases
where the victim of a wrong would normally have a moral enforcement right, the state is obligated to
provide an alternative means for the victim to bring about that enforcement.").
179.
Id. at 1922-23.
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the contract taxa is at bottom based on the notion that an ordinary breach
of promise is not "wrongful." These taxonomists can dodge any claim to
an "immoral" breach of contract (or conversely, in Gold's view, a breach
that creates a reciprocal "moral enforcement right" in the promissee) by
simply conceding that sometimes a breach of contract is a tort. This bit of
legerdemain is all too facile and sweeps the question of morality back
into the hopper. By reference to a baseline analysis of a tort as a legally
cognizable private wrong, a contemporary legal taxonomist can avoid the
legal philosopher's appeal to find "moral enforcement rights" in contractual relations.
Thus, Professor E. Allen Farnsworth blithely stated in his famous
treatise on contract law that the justification for reliance-based recovery
(such as in cases involving promissory estoppel) is essentially extra contractual and tort-based. As Farnsworth explained:
The possibility of an answer founded on principles of tort law is
inescapable, particularly if recovery is limited to the reliance measure. One person has caused harm to another by making a promise that
he should reasonably have expected would cause harm, and he is
80
therefore held liable for the harm caused.
Professor Barnett amplified Farnsworth's resort to a "wrong"-based
characterization of promissory estoppel theory as follows:
[A]lthough ... court[s] [speak] of promissory estoppel, [their] deci-

sion[s] may fit better into that field of liability for blameworthy conduct that we know as tort, instead of the field of liability based on obligations voluntarily assumed that we call contract.18 1
Contemporary legal taxonomists thusly redraw doctrinal lines to account for situations that appear to demand recognition of the "wrongs"
that may arise in the course of a contractual relationship. For the contemporary legal taxonomist, if recovery is based on "reliance" (i.e., the
right of the person "harmed") rather than the "consent" of the person
held liable (as in cases of promissory estoppel or fraud), then for the contemporary legal taxonomist the matter can be simply conceptually reclassified as a tort. There is then, putatively, no threat to the overall view that
contract law both governs and defers to the private ordering of legal obligations based on volition and consent (including consent to a predictable damages remedy in the event of an "efficient breach"). In the face of
180.
1241.
181.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 97-98 (1982), quoted in Barnett,supra note 164, at
Barnett, supra note 164, at 1241 (first alteration in original) (quoting E. ALLAN

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACT SCHOLARSHIP AND THE REEMERGENCE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 192

(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Randy Barnett, reviewing Professor Farnsworth's treatise, explains that in such cases "the tort-contract distinction is inadequate to account for,
much less resolve, the apparent tension between freedom of contract and reliance-based liability." Id.
at 1241.
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a "bad faith" breach of contract, the contemporary legal taxonomist, if so
inclined, can blithely find a tort arising out of breach of an implied promise in every contract to "fairly deal" with another. 18 2 In the case of a contract that limits liability, the contemporary legal taxonomist, if so inclined, can unashamedly find a violation of an implied in fact right enforceable in tort that is therefore incapable of volitional alienation (despite actual waiver) owing to "public policy" or some other ad hoc,
vaguely stated premise.183
Left to their own devices, moralists thus can and will never overcome the fetid legacy of the Romans' ex contractu distinction so deeply
embedded in contemporary legal theory and praxis. When a moralist runs
into the resistance of contemporary legal taxonomists, the taxonomists
will win the debate by stretching and reshaping the porous boundaries
that supposedly separate the "core" contours of the contemporary legal
taxa. This reality in practical terms may be insurmountable.
Yet, there is powerful reformative strength in asking what "rights"
are legally cognizable based principally on what is "just" in a "moral"
sense. 184 Although perhaps unable to avoid the squishy and unseemly
squirming and trickstering of contemporary legal taxonomists, laudably,
moralists directly challenge the more hollow aspects of contemporary
legal taxonomy. Their appeal does not depend upon the answer to sterile
questions about into which taxa a legal claim should fall. A moralist
identifies a primary moral right that has been infringed and the theory
that justifies the state compelling some form of redress for its infringement. These are the eternal questions of law, grounded in a fierce sense
of justice. Ironically, however, these principal strengths in the propositions of legal moralists are also fatal flaws.
Aside from whether any resort to morality as the principal justification for the enforcement of legally cognizable rights is likely to succeed
in the present American legal climate, a question remains whether such
resort should succeed. Are any but the most basic moral precepts sufficiently recognizable to effectively guide this or any other complex and
functioning legal system? I think not. Discerning inalterable "primary
moral rights" or "moral enforcements rights" has inarguably eluded resolution from time immemorial. Were systemic guidance ceded solely to
the legal moralists, the legal system in the United States would falter and
never achieve what the reformers during the fin de sidcle sought to cre-

182.
See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967).
183.
Meiman v. Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 444 S.W.2d 78, 79-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
184.
See, e.g., Helge Dedek, From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in Common and
Civil Private Law, 56 McGILL L.L 77, 104 (2010) ("Private law rights are not ends in themselves; of
what use, after all, are rights without remedies, substantive entitlements without any means of realization, if people do not comply with them? Does it not make sense to keep an eye on the possible
enforcement of a right while discussing its substantive merits?").
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ate: a "systematic reclassification of the law, which would make it easier
to teach and learn and more accessible to the public."'1 5
Because resting legally cognizable rights on moral obligation entrusts the ability to obtain remedies in court to the sometimes vague and
often difficult-to-understand standards propounded by contemporary
legal moralists, the theory of primary rights advocated by scholars like
Pomeroy is a superior means to move to a rights-based legal system-at
least insofar as legally cognizable primary rights are not postulated, but
derived, through the common law experience. For Pomeroy, primary
rights are discernible in "principles [that] emerge[] gradually through a
process of judicial deliberation that combine[s] reliance on precedent
with .. . gradually perfected [expansion tested] against the developing
natural justice ideal in particular cases."1 86 This process does not involve
the keyboarded postulations of legal moralists. The primary rights so
derived have been forged in the crucible of reality and polished by the
work of legal theorists and practitioners over centuries.
Despite any of their respective shortcomings, normative legal philosophers, moralists, and like-minded legal theorists who believe a
rights-based analysis of legal claims to be superior to the present system
of legal taxonomy can and should be allied. In the search for a means to
abandon contemporary legal taxonomy to focus more on legally cognizable primary rights, Professor Randy Barnett perhaps pointed the way
to a workable synthesis:
What is needed-and, I suggest, possible-is a theory of justice that
explains when legal force, whether it is exercised in the realm of contract or of tort, is morally justified. Such a theory must articulate the
rights people have and the ways in which these rights may be consensually or nonconsensually alienated. The fact that this is precisely the
mission upon which the new moral and legal philosophers have embarked highlights the importance of legal philosophy and the direct
role it can play in developing legal doctrines. The treatise writer is
.... in need of the philosopher's theory of justice, without which a
completely coherent doctrinal analysis will remain elusive.1
185. See Grey, supra note 2, at 1241.
186. See Bone, supranote 124, at 41-42.
187. Barnett, supra note 164, at 1245. Professor Barnett fits a rights-based view of contract law
neatly within a normative legal philosopher's frame: "[C]ommitments should be enforceable as
contracts when the parties effectuate the unilateral or bilateral transfer of alienable rights to resources in the world by manifesting their consent to a legally binding transfer." Id. at 1242.
Indeed, the moral justification for consent-based enforceability can be provided only by
underlying notions of rights. The two-step analysis under a consent theory-that is, the
bifurcated inquiry into rights and consent-shows the proper relationship between contract theory and a more fundamental theory of justice based on rights. The analysis can
thus explain the source of many of the extracontractual considerations that courts currently incorporate into contract law under the loose heading of "public policy" but that are
completely unaccounted for by either a bargain or a reliance theory of contractual obligation.
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Professor Barnett got this just about right: the quest to develop legal
doctrine in the service of what is "just" is perpetual.' 88 Fortunately, in the
roots of the contemporary legal system, there is already a venue in which
legal claims and remedies have been tested against theories of justice and
morality. That venue is not the writings and debates of contemporary
normative legal philosophers and moralists (though, these writings and
debates are of great value and influence nevertheless). It is still, as it has
been for centuries, the role of equitable jurisdiction in the common law
courts to break down the barbarism of formalism in the law and to give
true meaning to concerns about justice.189
By refashioning rules of law and thereby allowing remedies once
thought unavailable, the courts of equity have traditionally hastened the
development of a legal system unhampered by archaic doctrinal boundaries, while fostering a sense of controlling moral principles and fundamental justice. This is, perhaps, a form of the doctrinal coherence of
which Professor Barnett speaks.190 A "unification principle" has already
been at work in the United States (and other countries as well) under the
guise of an "equitable jurisdiction" in the merged courts of law and equity. These courts can focus competently less on ancient notions about
forms of action (and the relief thereby prescribed) and more on the
recognition of certain primary rights and remedies that Pomeroy championed.' 9'
Id. at 1244-45.
188.
See Calnan, supra note 141, at 559. Comparing the views of "instrumentalists," who argue
that private law is merely a means to achieving any number of political or social ends, with "deontologists," who contend that the law seeks only the moral end of justice and cannot be used for
anything else, Professor Calnan offers a composite theory called "instrumental justice" that
acknowledges the inherent instrumental nature of private law but establishes justice as its central,
organizing ideal. Professor Calnan summarizes:
So framed, instrumental justice's primary function is to create rights that serve as tools
for marking and mapping important interests, and for defending and vindicating those interests when they are threatened or impaired. Rights, in turn, both imbue the law with the
moral credibility necessary to perform secondary social functions, and prevent it from
pursuing these functions at the expense of its core principles.
Id.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67189.
68 (1993) ("Our substantive law is derived from common law, from equity, and from statute. [Frederick W.] Maitland [in I Equity I (2d ed. 1936)] correctly observed . .. that it is impossible to generalize about the things that came from equity. . . . He also noted that the most basic rights and legal
concepts came from common law. When equity imposed personal duties . .. it presupposed legal
rights of property and contract. Equity without common law, Maitland said, would have been 'a
castle in the air.' He was right. But the other half of his comparison was equally right: Common law
without equity would have been a functioning system, but in many applications it would have been
'barbarous, unjust, absurd.' It is hardly surprising that we have not abandoned equity and reverted to
barbarism. To the contrary, substantive equity is now fully integrated into our substantive law, with
or without continued consciousness of its equitable origins.").
Barnett, supra note 164, at 1245 (referring to "coherent doctrinal analysis").
190.
POMEROY, supra note 118. Pomeroy noted that jurisdiction in equity provides "those
191.
doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies, which the common law, by reason of
its fixed methods and remedial system, [is] either unable or inadequate in the regular course of its
development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it therefore [has] either tacitly omitted or
openly rejected." Id. at 89; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 177, at 2156 ("In the latter
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Since the early twentieth century, the constant and inexorable obscuring of the porous boundaries thought by some to keep tort and contract law distinct has been advanced by the abandonment of judge-made
doctrinal restraints.19 2 Unified courts can and do blend and transform
doctrinal principles once thought inviolate, making possible the dissolution of formalistic distinctions between "tort" and "contract" law.
-

As stated by Kevin M. Teeven:
After the abolition of the forms of action and the complete fusion
of law and equity in American jurisdictions during the second half of
the nineteenth century, the way was open to consider the possibility
of ... a third branch of private law independent of contracts and

torts .... As it became irrelevant whether a remedy was obtainable
under a particular form, courts began to pry open the old common
counts to determine their foundation and meaning. In the process,
courts recognized the existence of a third category of the common
law grounded upon neither tortious conduct nor bargain ... .193
A proper synthesis of legal and equitable principles avoids the "barbarism" of formalistic adherence to doctrinal distinctions, yet tethers
courts' discretion to juridical traditions and precedent.194 Abandonment
of doctrinal distinctions in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction does not
toss away the past. Instead, liberation from the doctrinal shackles of the
past allows a court to draw from the law of contract and torts (and all the
other old taxa) to properly discern legally cognizable rights' 95 and to
half of the nineteenth century, John Norton Pomeroy, in his treatises Remedies and Remedial Rights
and Equity Jurisprudence . . . address[ed] whether equity merely provided additional remedial rights
for the same primary rights as those vindicated at common law or instead vindicated additional
primary rights.").
192. See, e.g., Vincent A. Wellman, Assessing the Economic Loss Doctrine in Michigan:
Making Sense out of the Development of Law, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 791, 861 (2008) ("[I1f one goes
back far enough, it should be clear that both tort law and contract law (and any sense of the boundary
that divides them) are the result of judicial decision-making with little or no guidance or-even
attention-given by the legislative branch. ... [T]he ongoing development of torts and contracts [is]
a development that has been judge-made since its inception.").
193.
Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on Market Transactionsin the Absence of a
Bargain, 39 Am. BUs. L.J. 289, 339 (2002).
194. The courts of equitable jurisdiction have been traditionally guided by a form of precedent
known as the "equitable maxims." See, e.g., Regions Bank v. Wingard Props., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 348,
352 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011) ("Equitable maxims are not binding legal precedent but represent notions
and concepts of equity in various situations."); see also RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF

REMEDIES LAW 8 (2007) ("[Equity courts] ... began to develop 'rules' or 'maxims' governing
equitable relief. Although these 'maxims' were generalizations of experience based on the results of
prior cases, they eventually developed into a loose set of 'rules' designed to bring some coherency to
the body of decided cases and some consistency to future decisions."). Maxims developed, at least in
part, to reflect the attempt by the courts of equity to create guiding principles, in the same way that
the courts of law have developed binding precedents. See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,
41 F.2d 929, 936 (D. Ohio 1930) ("Maxims are but attempted general statements of rules of law. The
judicial process is the continuous effort on the part of the courts to state accurately these general
rules, with their proper and necessary limitations and exceptions.").
195. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920, 34 HARV. L. REV.
388, 393-94 (1921) ("[1]t is important to ascertain the nature of [coterminous legal theory] to understand the basis of equity jurisdiction, [because] courts of equity [often] are not really dealing with

2012]

LEA VING CONTEAPORARY LEGAL TAXONOMY

265

afford relief in the form of remedies unhampered by taxonomic classification. 19 6 The true merger of law and equity makes possible a more rational system in which at long last the old maxim will hold true that "for
every right there is a remedy."' 97
Of course, not all legal scholars have applauded or will welcome
encroachments upon contemporary doctrinal distinctions.' 98 For the past
any question of equity but with the law of torts, just as they determine the law of contracts, when
they ask whether a promise has consideration before they specifically enforce it.").
196. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-MergerJustification of
Unclean Hands, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 509 (2007) ("Continued reliance on outmoded anachronisms
of law and equity in order to determine the availability of [a particular defense] is to chase ghosts
and leave courts in a constant state of epistemic failure. It also limits the legal reasoning process of
judges to formulations designed in the dark days of the common law. Adherence to the increasingly
irrelevant labels of law and equity additionally diverts judicial resources from the true interests at
stake and deprives the law of its ability to meet the needs of an ever-changing society. Distinctions
between legal and equitable defenses are dead. They were buried with the merger. It is time for
courts to begin writing their obituary.").
197. See, e.g., Andrew Burrows, We Do This At Common Law But That In Equity, 22 OXFORD
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 1, 4 (2002) ("While there are areas where common law and equity can happily
sit alongside one another, there are many examples of inconsistencies between them. It is important
to remove the inconsistencies thereby producing a coherent or harmonized law. In developing the
law it is legitimate for the courts to reason from common law to equity and vice versa. A harmonized
rule or principle that has features of both common law and equity is at the very least acceptable and,
depending on the rule or principle in question, may represent the best way for the law to develop. It
is submitted that the latter view is to be strongly preferred. There are numerous instances of inconsistencies between common law and equity; and to support fusion seems self-evident, resting, as it
does, on not being slaves to history and on recognizing the importance of coherence in the law and
of 'like cases being treated alike."'); see also Bone, supra note 124, at 26 ("For those who subscribe[] [to the view that the rights enforced by the common law should duplicate much of the rights
structure of equity], the solution [is] clear. First, the anomalous and indefensible distinction between
law and equity ha[s] to be eliminated, that is, law and equity ha[vel to be merged. Second, the antiquated forms of action [need] to be abolished and the natural classification of causes of action based
on the nature of abstract rights and duties substituted for the irrational categories defined by the
forms. With law and equity merged and the forms of action abolished, judges [will] be free to apply
the ideal system of substantive general principles to resolve all controversies openly and without use
of fictions. And abolition of the forms of action [will] have the additional benefit of jettisoning the
arbitrary common-law limitations on types of remedies and extending the equitable principle of
remedial flexibility to the merged system as a whole."); Laycock, supra note 189, at 71 ("Equitable
doctrine ... should continue to develop in harmony with related legal doctrines, and on the basis of
sound policy in a modern democratic society. I submit that no question concerning the scope or
content of these doctrines should any longer depend on whether they historically arose in law or
equity. The substantive rules that govern our behavior should not depend on the historical jurisdiction of ancient courts that were merged fifty-five or one hundred forty-five years ago."); Anenson,
supra note 196, at 457-58 ("[Tlhe content and application of a particular law in any given controversy should not depend on the historical happenstance of whether it originated in law or equity.
Because the historic boundary between law and equity was accidental and not functional, functional
choices about the role of discretion, the method of adjudication, or an award of damages or specific
performance should be considered outwardly and independently on their merits.").
198.
See, e.g., Israel Gilead, Non-Consensual Liability of a ContractingParty: Contract, Negligence, Both, or In-Between?, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 511, 514 (2002) ("To achieve its goals,
the legal system functions through 'intermediaries' such as tort and contract, each of which has a
different agenda, different characteristics, and built-in limitations. Liability must, therefore, be
characterized as tortious, contractual, or both. There should not be 'liability in the air,' liability that
has no defined origins."); R.P. MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMow & J.R.F. LEHANE, EQUITY, DOCTRINES
AND REMEDIES (3d ed. 1992) ("[The fusion fallacy] involves the conclusion that the new system was
not devised to administer law and equity concurrently but to 'fuse' them into a new body of principles comprising rules neither of law nor of equity but of some new jurisprudence conceived by
accident, born by misadventure and nourished by sour but high-minded wet-nurses."); T. Leigh
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fifty or so years in particular, as the pace of erosion of the boundaries
between tort and contract law has accelerated, more than a few scholars
have mourned the "death of contract," albeit in various ways.1 99 Most of
this mourning is misplaced, however. A synthesis of tort and contract
theory is more historically sound than the unsound distinctions between
the two that it displaces.
To be sure, any prescriptions for progress based on the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction must necessarily be undertaken cautiously. Faults
associated with the exercise of equitable jurisdiction are inevitable. There
are particular grounds for concern insofar as trial courts in the United
States continue to indulge the untoward fiction that unfettered discretion
is inherent in the exercise of equitable powers. 2 00 Trial judges who purport to "sit in equity" are inclined on occasion to act on the faulty belief
that this fictional position affords them nearly absolute discretion. And
this faulty belief is encouraged because decisions in "equity" are too
often insufficiently checked by the courts of appeal.2 0' Insufficient precedential value afforded to decisions in "equity," together with ineffectual
appellate review of ad hoc adjudication, can promote outcomes just as
dysfunctional and confused as those that rely on contemporary legal taxonomy.
Yet, a carefully reasoned response to these concerns overcomes
them. Failings in the course of the common law are more often than not
corrected. The English courts of equity ultimately established distinct
precedents and adhered to them.202 Indeed, by the eighteenth century,
Anenson & Donald 0. Mayer, "Clean Hands" and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote for Excessive
Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947, 982 n.134 (2010) (collecting authorities addressing the
"fusion wars" in various common law countries).
199.
See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 2, at 103; Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54
U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 370 (2004) ("Grant Gilmore predicted the death of contract. He saw the
expansion of legal liability for relied-upon promises as evidence that contract was being swallowed
up by tort and would soon disappear as an independent, coherent body of law... . [Notably,] for
Gilmore, the triumph of reliance over bargain was an entirely salutary development.").
200.
See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, From Theory to Practice: Analyzing Equitable Estoppel
Under a Pluralistic Model of Law, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633, 641-42 (2007) ("The chaotic
state of equity jurisprudence makes ... cases easy to distinguish. Moreover, a risk in equity, or in
any other area of law with abstract concepts like justice, is that the rules of decision become a freefor-all for the courts and make the identification ofdecisional patterns difficult.").
201.
There unfortunately remains today a distinct reluctance on the part of appellate courts to
disturb the judgments of a modem-day "Chancellor," even though the role of a current American
judge has little or no relation at all to the role of an eighteenth-century English "Chancellor." See,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975) (explaining that "discretion" is
"unfettered by meaningful standards and shielded from thorough appellate review"); Cravens, supra
note 116, at 958 ("For discretion to have real meaning, lower court judges must not be subject, in
their exercise of judgment, to reversal based on mere second guessing or differences of opinion by
the appellate court. Indeed, that would change what the law is."); Denham v. Superior Court, 468
P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1970) ("[Ulnless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court will
not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power."). But see
Barnett v. Gomance, 377 S.W.3d 317, 323 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010) ("Equity cases are reviewed de novo
on appeal.").
202.
See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. EQUITY § 6 (2012) ("The doctrine of stare decisis became an established part of equity jurisprudence. Thenceforth, equity ceased to be a mere corrective agency and
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critics complained that the English courts of equity were as hide-bound
as the courts of law.203 Thus, "equitable jurisdiction" properly understood
and viewed in actual practice for centuries has not been a pretext to justify any solution to a difficult problem that is irreconcilable with rigid adherence to formalistic rules of law.
Modernly, most judges and attorneys agree that courts are obliged
to provide predictable guidance and equality before the law, and to that
end, may not change the rules at will to suit personal predilections or
2
idiosyncratic notions of "fairness." 2 04 Resorts
to "divine law" are rare. 205
Contemporary courts are much more likely to avoid haphazard or ad hoc
adjudication. The common law possesses its own dynamic, subject to
external influences, but is nearly always typified by slow and careful
incremental adjustments.
Jurisdiction in equity is a grand fiction in a contemporary American
court. Still, it is an analytical construct that focuses more on remedies for
violation of primary rights than on restricting remedies based on unattainable taxonomic purity. There is a poetic symmetry in the notion that
the legal fiction of equitable discretion unburdened by doctrinal distinctions may be ultimately the analytic convention that can overcome an

became a definite system of jurisprudence occupying the field side by side with the common law,
each with a distinct jurisdiction, and, therefore, necessarily there also grew up, not only two distinct
systems of practice in these courts, but also two distinct systems of substantive jurisprudence . .. .").
203.
Anenson, supra note 200, at 643-44 ("In fact, the English Court of Chancery during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came to be called a court of 'crystallized conscience.' This
rigidity, or rigor aequitatisas it was called, emitted equitable precepts that came to suffer the same
fate as the rules of the common law. The court's inability or unwillingness to account for the surrounding circumstances was denounced as defeating the ultimate purpose of the legal system to
provide just results."); Bellia, supra note 109, at 783-84 ("Though the prescribed forms of proceeding in equity were more 'flexible' than those at law, they were 'prescribed' nonetheless."); id at
789-90 ("If the common law failed to fulfill the maxim ubijus, ibi remedium, did equity, with its
own maxim that it 'will not suffer a right to be without a remedy,' fulfill it? In its early days, equity
jurisprudence may well have been thought to derive from principles of conscience and natural justice. . . . By the eighteenth century, however, Blackstone would describe equity as a system ofjurisprudence as 'equally artificial' as the common law, different only in its usages in the forms and
modes of its proceedings.... In 1815, in the preface to his treatise on equity practice in the High
Court of Chancery, Henry Maddock mused that 'if it were true, that the Chancellor, in the exercise
of his Jurisdiction, acted only, as is vulgarly supposed, according to an unbounded discretion ... it
would be a folly to attempt to systematise the doctrines of Chancery.' The Chancellor's discretion, in
fact, was anything but unbounded.... Equity practice in America, as a general matter, was similarly
bounded [as i]n 1836, [when] Joseph Story explained the formal, remedies-based nature of equity
practice that prevailed around the time of the American Founding. . .
204. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 197, at 2.
205. But see, e.g., State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1031
(Okla. 1985) ("Human law is the offspring of divine law. One of the strongest principles of law is
compensation. Every man compensates his own wrong. He cannot claim the benefits of it." (quoting
Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Weightman, 160 P. 629, 631 (Okla. 1916) (holding a life insurance
beneficiary was not entitled to the benefits of a policy despite her acquittal in a murder trial after she
killed the policyholder)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

268

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 90:1

equally untoward legal fiction that elevates taxonomy to a set of governing legal principles.206
V. CONCLUSION

Inequities arise from the present system of legal taxonomy. These
inequities are not the inevitable derivative of an unavoidably imprecise
but necessary system of doctrinal classification. Rather, these inequities
are the product of the choices made during a period of great reform of the
legal system in the United States about one hundred years ago.
During this period, referred to herein as the "fin de si~cle," John
Norton Pomeroy and others proposed a rights-based organization of legally cognizable claims analytically superior to the methodology of restricting relief based on the fuzzy taxonomic classifications familiar today. This achievable alternative would have consigned the then-nascent
precepts of contemporary taxonomy to the dustbin of legal history. Instead, the precepts of an ancien rigime prevailed.
The question remains how best to achieve the goal of allowing all
appropriate relief upon infringement of cognizable primary legal rights,
within the bounds of precedent and the incremental development that is
associated with the common law. At present, there is again a rising appeal to move incrementally to a rights-based system of legal claims and
remedies that focuses more on upholding enduring values than on enforcing formalistic taxonomic distinctions.
For those who hold that the design of any functioning judicial system will be inevitably imperfect, no paradigm can be genuinely propounded as the perfect solution to every legal challenge. Yet, in the
foundations of the legal system in the United States, one finds an elegant
legal theory fashioned from the roots of established primary rights that
abjures the sort of senseless legal taxonomy that demands bloodletting
debates typified by a recent mil6e about whether negligent misrepresentation should be classified as a breach of contract.
Primary rights theory, albeit elegant, is not without faults but in
practice obliges and relies upon the incremental improvement that is the
hallmark of the common law. It is in the inexorable currents of legal history that grounds for optimism can be found, but not in the work of legal
taxonomists who, over the past century in particular, have created so
much dysfunction to the pointless end of demonstrably unsound dogma
about contracts and torts.

206. To paraphrase former President William J. Clinton Jr., there is nothing wrong with the
American judicial system that can't be fixed with what is right with American judicial system. Larry
King Live, (CNN television broadcast June 1,2005).

